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ABSTRACT
This Article seeks to uncover invisible gender, race, and class biases
driving modern Fourth Amendment discourse. Unlike traditional theories,
which tend to view the Fourth Amendment through the lens of either priva-
cy or property, this Article advances a theory focusing on the real issues
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of power and control that fuel Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Specifi-
cally, the Article exposes the private/public and home/market dichotomies
that are central to the Supreme Court rhetoric as arbitrary and artificial.
It finds that current Fourth Amendment discourse protects the interest of
white, privileged men and perpetuates male ideology as well as male dom-
ination. That focus leaves women, people of color, and those less privi-
leged, unprotected. In opposition to that discourse, this Article offers a
re-reading of the historical sources of the Fourth Amendment in a way
that re-emphasizes the amendment's core: curbing subordinating power.
It broadens the traditional focus on power abuses of one's privacy or
property and arguse that we need to conduct Fourth Amendment inquiries
through a prism of multiple, web-like hierarchies. To that end, the Article
explores several possibilities of modeling an alternative, feminist Fourth
Amendment, including articulating the Fourth Amendment around an anti-
subordination principle, employing a multi-focal approach to Fourth
Amendment adjudication, and infusing search and seizure law with multi-
ple perspectives in the form of personal narratives.
I. INTRODUCTION
In its landmark 2012 decision United States v. Jones,' regarding the govern-
ment's use of a Global Positioning Satellite ("GPS") tracking device to monitor
the movement of a private vehicle, the Supreme Court put into question close to
five decades of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence revolving around privacy in-
terests and resurrected a seemingly abandoned property-based framework.
While scholars no doubt will engage in much discussion on the meaning of the
Jones decision and the future of search and seizure law, this article suggests
that we should take the opportunity to rethink Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence as a whole. Rather than viewing the Fourth Amendment as intended to
specifically protect either privacy or private property interests, we should focus
on the real issues of power and control that fuel searches and seizures.
The Fourth Amendment and its analogs in state constitutions have spawned a
huge and complex body of case law, described as "a labyrinth of rules built
upon a series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions." 2
As recent events demonstrate, the battle over the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment has only intensified, touching all our lives. The question is wheth-
er there is a new way to look at the Fourth Amendment-a way out of its
1 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2 State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Even
Professor Daniel Solove, a leading Fourth Amendment scholar, who for a long time believed
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be rationalized with a nuanced technologically-adept
understanding of privacy, has recently declared he was wrong and called for abandoning the
reasonable expectations of privacy text altogether. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment
Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (2010).
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current entangled state. I have previously suggested that a critical reexamina-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and its jurisprudence through feminist lenses
can shed new light and add to its understanding.3
While there is no one theory that unifies feminist legal scholars, and while
feminist theories join other critical schools of thought in the struggle against
social and legal structures of subordination and alienation, this Article suggets
that certain facets of feminist epistemology and feminist methodology are par-
ticularly suited to advance that inquiry.' In general, feminist jurisprudence is
3 See, e.g., Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of
the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 155 (2008). Generally, there has not
been a fundamental and comprehensive feminist challenge to the Fourth Amendment. The
few examples of a feminist critique of the Fourth Amendment include Mary E. Becker, The
Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 453, 453-54 (1992) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment neither gives women
security in their homes from their husbands nor ensures that the government treat marital
rape like other rapes and assaults, as part of a more general argument that the Bill of Rights
does less to solve the problems of women and non-propertied men than to solve the
problems of men of property, especially white men of property); Mary I. Coombs, Shared
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593,
1596-1600 (1987) (advocating a relational approach to the Fourth Amendment doctrines of
"standing" and "third-party consent searches"); Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89
GEO. L.J. 2047 (2001) (arguing that e-mail monitoring in the workplace or disclosure of
medical information should be regarded as issues of power and control rather than privacy);
Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government's Hands Off Our Bodies: Mapping a Feminist
Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison Searches, 4 Bur. CRIM. L. REV.
861 (2001) [hereinafter Miller, Cross-Gender Prison Searches]; Teresa A. Miller, Sex &
Surveillance: Gender, Privacy, and the Sexualization of Power in Prison, 10 GEO. MASON
U. C.R. L.J. 291 (2000) [hereinafter Miller, Sex and Surveillance].
There is some critical race and class oriented scholarship that can significantly inform a
feminist exploration of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V.
Ward, Teaching Race and the Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 323 (1995)
(using narratives to question and contextualize color-blind reasonableness in police-minority
encounters); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interro-
gations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998) (advocating the elimination of consent searches dur-
ing a traffic stop in light of the inherent power disparities in police-initiated encounters,
especially concerning minority drivers); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motor-
ists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 271; David D. Troutt,
Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police
Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a
Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Per-
son, " 36 HOWARD L.J. 239 (1993).
' My feminist critique of the Fourth Amendment, however, is not limited to exposing the
implications of search and seizure law for women as women. It is an integral part of my
feminist commitment to address racism, class-bias, heterosexism, and other forms of oppres-
sion as well as mate domination. I see the multi-dimensional webs of power and powerless-
ness that connect all forms of social and legal subordination, and I believe that only a femi-
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concerned with the gendered underpinnings of legal doctrines and legal reason-
ing, with the male standard implicit in the norms that are central to legal rea-
soning, and with the epistemological standpoint from which the law operates,
i.e., its purported "point-of-viewlessness."' Following feminist inquiries in
other areas of the law, this Article seeks to flesh out the invisible biases that
underlie the facially objective and neutral legal standards of search and seizure
law. In particular, this Article argues that current Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence embodies traditionally male values, and specifically reflects a male-
white-elitist perspective. Such a male perspective is evident in the formulation
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence around several meta-narratives (pervasive-
ly utilized in many other areas of the law as well) including those of reasona-
bleness and objectivity,6 of the reasonable person,7 and of free choice and con-
sent.8
Such a male-white-elitist perspective is first and foremost evident in the for-
mulation of Fourth Amendment scope and discourse around privacy and pri-
vate property. As much controversy as the application of the "expectations of
privacy" standard has generated inside and outside the Court, the formulation
of Fourth Amendment analysis in terms of privacy interests remained largely
uncontested in the cases that followed Katz v. United States.9 Even the Jones
nist theory that aims to acknowledge and dismantle these multiple web-like structures of
domination can improve women's lives and the lives of other oppressed members of society.
I Dana Raigrodski, No Reason for the Reasonable Person: Feminist Lessons from the
Fourth Amendment, 1 DISORIENT: CRITICAL LEGAL J. PAC. NORTHWEST (2009), http://stu-
dents.washington.edu/dislaw/index.php?issue=1&mode=article&section=all&article
id=6591. The phrase "point-of-viewlessness" was coined by Catharine MacKinnon. See,
e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). Such
unmasking of male norms at the core of purportedly gender-neutral standards is the focus of
most of the feminist scholarship reviewed and advanced in this article.
6 See Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 156-57.
1 See Raigrodski, supra note 5.
8 See Dana Raigrodski, Consent Engendered: A Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth
Amendment Searches, 16 HASTINGs WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (2005).
9 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The dominant narrative of privacy and
the public-private divide in search and seizure law resurfaces in most of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment cases, and determines the course of its jurisprudence. See also, e.g.,
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) ("[T]he primary object of the Fourth Amend-
ment . . . [is] the protection of privacy."); id. at 591 ("[J]nsofar as Fourth Amendment pro-
tection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our
inquiry."). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335, 361-62 (1985); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); id. at 187 (Marshall, J., dissenting): United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07
(1983); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 160 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
312 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). On the other hand, several
prominent Fourth Amendment scholars have criticized the Court's focus on privacy interests
as the essence of Fourth Amendment protections. See Part III infra.
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decision continues to tie together property and privacy interests.'o To the ex-
tent that the dominant narrative of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence has been framed in terms of privacy and the public-private divide, it is
ripe for feminist critique of privacy in general, and the public-private, home-
market dichotomies in particular.
Parts Two and Three address the public-private discourse in search and
seizure law, as well as the home-market and intimate-commercial dichotomies
that animate it. These parts examine the gap between the Court's rhetoric,
which values the private sphere, and its practice, which narrowly construes the
private sphere and limits the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Conse-
quently, this Article argues that current Fourth Amendment discourse and the
public-private dichotomy are construed to protect the interests of white, privi-
leged men and to perpetuate male ideology and domination.
Part Four begins examining Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through the
lens of power hierarchies and oppression. Rather than viewing the protection
of private property and privacy interests as the end-goal of the Fourth Amend-
ment, this Article suggests that both are mere proxies to the core of the Fourth
Amendment. This Article offers a feminist re-reading of the historical sources
of the Fourth Amendment to argue that the focus on manifestations of power in
the form of privacy or property violations as the paradigm of the Fourth
Amendment represents the lived experiences and interests of a particular group
of people-white, privileged men. By perpetuating a male-centered perspec-
tive as the norm, that focus leaves women, people of color, and those less privi-
leged unprotected. Instead of a partial and elitist privacy and property dis-
course, this Article argues, we need to conduct our Fourth Amendment
inquiries through a prism of multiple, web-like power hierarchies.
Finally, in Part Five, this Article proposes an alternative feminist Fourth
Amendment-one that will actually keep its promise to provide protection and
security to all of us. The proposal includes adopting a constantly shifting, mul-
ti-perspectival jurisprudence-both as a matter of substance and as a matter of
form. Primarily, this Article re-articulates Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
around an anti-subordination principle. It also calls for employing a multi-focal
approach to Fourth Amendment adjudication and discourse, an approach that
transcends our current way of determining a constitutional violation and of de-
termining whose voices should be heard and given preference. Methodologi-
cally, it suggests we infuse search and seizure law with multiple perspectives of
Fourth Amendment scenarios in the form of personal narratives, so as to ex-
pand our bases of knowledge and understanding of multiple, 'other' perspec-
tives. Such a commitment to anti-subordination and empowerment is especially
suited for the newly envisioned power-centered Fourth Amendment.
10 See infra Part IHA; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945-54 (2012).
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II. THE MULTI-LAYERED MEANINGS OF PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
DIVIDE IN FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
The concept of privacy and the public-private distinction within Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence resonate in multiple dimensions. This could be ex-
pected, considering the multi-layered and complex construction of privacy in
law and society in general. This is especially so, I would argue, in light of the
ideology inherently embedded in the notion of privacy and the public-private
dichotomy. "Privacy is not a coherent concept and it does not lead to any
indisputable policy choices,"" writes Frances Olsen. Elsewhere she explains
that "'[p]rivate' is not a natural attribute nor descriptive in a factual sense, but
rather is a political and contestable designation;"l 2 a normative designation of
how things should be treated." The Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
illustrates as much.
A. Protecting the Private Sphere-The Paradigm of the "Home" and
Private Property
The Fourth Amendment articulates the right of the people "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. . ."14 The text evidently reflects a close connection to private proper-
ty in enumerating houses, papers and effects," and, consequently, until the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century Fourth Amendment cases took primarily a
property-based, common-law trespass approach. 16 At the same time, the recog-
nition that something else is at stake beyond the encroachment on private prop-
erty rights surfaced early on.
In his oft-quoted dissent in Olmstead v. United States," Justice Brandeis
concluded that
[t]he makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
" Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 862 n.73 (1985).
12 Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 (1993).
13 Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 n.2 (1993); see also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the
Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) ("[T]he terms 'private' and 'public'
occur in various senses, which are distinct though interrelated . .. these terms typically have
both descriptive and normative meanings.").
14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (relying on Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington,
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.)).
16 Id.
17 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.18
Similarly, in Wolf v. Coloradol9 the Court had stated that "[t]he security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment," 20 but it was not until Katz v. United States21 that privacy
directly shaped Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by reorienting the constitu-
tional inquiry around a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."22 Recent-
ly, the Court essentially reaffirmed the Katz doctrine in United States v. Jones,
stating that we must "assure preservation of that degree of privacy against gov-
ernment that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."23
Central to its reconstruction of the Fourth Amendment's core meaning in
Katz was the Court's declaration that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places." 24 This idea suggested that the Court would abandon its former
property-based standard of trespass and physical intrusion. However, as the
Court held in Jones,25 Katz did not repudiate the historical trespass framework;
it merely established that it is not the exclusive measure of Fourth Amendment
violations. 26 In fact, while the Court's cases over the years seem to suggest the
primacy of the privacy-based analysis in lieu of property-based analysis, the
determination of privacy interests in post-Katz cases continued to be inextrica-
bly bound up with private property and particular places. 27 As Justice Harlan
noted, answering the question of what protection the Fourth Amendment af-
11 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'9 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
20 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27. rev'd on other grounds, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Camara v.
Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recog-
nized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individ-
uals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect per-
sonal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
21 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)
("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy. . . .").
22 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
24 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
25 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
26 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51. Hence, the Court emphasized, "the Katz 'reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy' test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespas-
sory test." Id. at 952 (emphasis in the original).
27 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) ("[T]he extent to which the
Fourth Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are."); California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 395 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The character of 'the place to
be searched' plays an important role in Fourth Amendment analysis.").
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fords generally "requires reference to a 'place.' "28 Paradigmatically, that place
is one's home.
The sanctity of the home and its prototypical place at the center of the private
sphere is uncontroversial. Thus, the Court early on declared that at the very
core of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion," 29 and that
the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed."30 Similarly, in Payton v. New York,31 the
Court stated that "[f]reedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the
archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment."32 The
Court explained that
[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms. . . . In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to
seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. 3
In sum, the home stands as "the most essential bastion of privacy recognized
by the law."34 Hence, under the Katz standard, one's expectation of privacy in
28 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Entick v. Carrington,
(1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (K.B.)); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30); cited
with approval in, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), and more recently in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
30 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); see also Rodriguez, 497
U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
32 Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 589-90.
34 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at
99-100 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special
protection as the center of the private lives of our people. . . . The axiom that a man's home
is his castle ... has acquired over time a power and an independent significance justifying a
more general assurance of personal security in one's home, an assurance which has become
part of our constitutional tradition."); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 883 (1987) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) ("The search in this case was conducted in petitioner's home, the place
that traditionally has been regarded as the center of a person's private life, the bastion in
which one has a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.");
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) ("The Amendment reflects the recognition
of the Framers that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference.
For example, the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the republic."' (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 601); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
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one's home is generally per se reasonable and deserves the most protection. As
the Court noted in United States v. Karo,35 "private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion
not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable."36
Another place often referred to in the Court's jurisprudence in determining
the extent of privacy protected under the Fourth Amendment is the "curtilage"
of the home. However, the protection of the curtilage does not exist indepen-
dently from the protection afforded to the home, but is rather inextricably tied
to it and stems from the similarity of the curtilage to the paradigm of the home.
Hence, since "[t]he curtilage is an area to which the private activities of the
home extend,"" it follows that "the protection afforded to it is essentially a
protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the
home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are
most heightened."38
To embrace the private sphere under the protective umbrella of the Fourth
Amendment is, consequently, to exclude that which is public from its protec-
tion. Therefore, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
U.S. 740, 754 (1984) ("The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, nighttime
entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest,
however, is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home
by the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) ("The right
of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not only to the individu-
al, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveil-
lance.") (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)); see also Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 621 (2006) (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006));
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
35 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
36 Id. at 714; see also Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of
constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of
our homes during the night.").
As I will demonstrate later in discussing the Court's treatment of a mobile home, the
Court's view of what is one's "home" may also prove problematic. While the Supreme
Court has yet to hear a case regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to residents
of homeless shelters, several lower courts have struggled with the applicability of the privacy
and home-public space analysis to homeless shelters. See Steven Morrison, The Fourth
Amendment Applicability to Residents of Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. Rav. 319
(2009). The article argues that while residents of homeless shelters have a certain level of
privacy in these shelters as "homes," the unique structure of most shelters requires a differ-
ent approach-one based on the balancing framework of Terry v. Ohio.
37 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986).
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own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."39 As
with the physical embodiment of the private sphere in the home and curtilage,
so does the public sphere find its physical manifestation in the Court's "open
fields" and "plain view" doctrines. And in the same way that the private and
the public are dichotomously paired, so too are open fields and things in plain
view treated as the opposition of the home. In Hester v. United States,40 for
example, the Court held that open fields are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment since "distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the
common law."41 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Jones, similarly
noted that an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of the pro-
tected areas enumerated in the Fourth amendment.42
The designation of other places or objects as private or public, and the extent
of Fourth Amendment protection consequently afforded, has been accordingly
determined by measuring them against the paradigmatic dichotomy of the pri-
vate home and curtilage versus the public open fields and plain view. Hence,
since a telephone booth resembles a home rather than an open field,43 it is
designated to the private sphere. On the other hand, garbage bags left for col-
lection on the public street outside the curtilage of the home,44 or open areas of
an industrial plant complex,4 5 fall within the public sphere and are not accorded
protection.
39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) ("[A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected'
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.").
40 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
41 Id. at 59; see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) ("[T]he common
law distinguished 'open fields' from the 'curtilage,' the land immediately surrounding and
associated with the home. . . . The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neigh-
boring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home.").
42 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J. concurring).
I California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37, 40-41 (1988) ("The issue here is whether
the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for col-
lection outside the curtilage of a home. We conclude ... that it does not.... It is common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. ...
Accordingly, having deposited their garbage 'in an area particularly suited for public inspec-
tion,' . . . respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy .... ") (citations
omitted).
4 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) ("We conclude that the
open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous plant structures spread over an area
of 2,000 acres are not analogous to the 'curtilage' of a dwelling for purposes of aerial sur-
veillance; such an industrial complex is more comparable to an open field and as such it is
open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace. . .
(footnote omitted).
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The classification of motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes espe-
cially occupies the Court and demonstrates the limits of both the privacy-based
analysis and the property-based analysis. Until recently, the Court employed
only Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis to effectively allow
the government to freely monitor the movement of private citizens. In Cardwell
v. Lewis,46 the Court held that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle because "it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository
of personal effects."47 A car cannot escape public scrutiny; it travels on public
roads where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. In Rakas v.
Illinois,49 the Court reaffirmed the idea that one's expectation of privacy in an
automobile is significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy
and freedom in a residence, emphasizing that automobiles operate on public
streets, are serviced and usually parked in public places, and their interiors are
highly visible from outside the vehicle."o Consequently, one has no expectation
of privacy whatsoever in the car's external Vehicle Identification Number
("VIN")" or in one's movements on public roads from one place to another,
thus allowing the government to track the location of individuals by placing
beepers in containers the individuals later placed in their cars.52
But when the government then took the liberty and for nearly a month
tracked the comings and goings of Antoine Jones, a suspected drug dealer, by
attaching a GPS tracking device to the underside of his vehicle, the Supreme
Court decided to finally constrain the government's surveillance powers.53 Un-
able to regulate the government's conduct under its established privacy analy-
sis, the Court resorted to the long-disfavored, property-based trespass analysis
and held that a Fourth Amendment search did occur when the government
physically intruded on protected (enumerated) private property.54 As the con-
curring judges pointed out, however, the majority's property-based analysis is
less than satisfactory" and, this Article argues, not much better than its priva-
46 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
47 Id. at 590.
48 Id. at 590; aff'd, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986).
49 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
5o Id. at 153-54. See also Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
51 Class, 475 U.S. at 114 ("[I]t is unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an
object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from the exterior of
the automobile. The VIN's mandated visibility makes it more similar to the exterior of the
car than to the trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of the car, of course, is thrust into
the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a 'search.'").
52 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984).
5 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
54 Id. at 949, 952.
5 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor J, concurring) and 958 (Alito J., concurring).
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cy-based analysis in regulating government conduct.
The Jones scenario, this Article suggests, caused unease amongst the Justices
and beckoned visions of future governmental abuse of its unabridged discretion
to monitor the movement and location of any citizen using suspicion-less drag-
net operations and novel surveillance technologies. However, rather than focus-
ing on curbing police power as the core of the Fourth Amendment,56 the Court
struggles to maintain its focus on privacy and property interests.
B. Intimacy and the Family-Market Dichotomy
Of course, privacy and the private sphere encompass much more than mere
physical or geographical zones of privacy. More than anything, privacy con-
notes emotional, mental, and physical intimacy and seclusion; the private
sphere is accordingly associated with family life and a place of retreat from the
harsh public sphere. As the Court observed in Silverman v. United States, "[a]
sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from
public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place
which is a man's castle."" In contrast, the public sphere has come to be identi-
fied with the marketplace, and with commercial rather than personal and inti-
mate relationships and activities. These dichotomous notions of the market and
the workplace versus the intimate home and the family play a central role in the
Court's Fourth Amendment "expectation of privacy" analysis. Thus, time and
again the Court has held that expectations of privacy in commercial premises or
in one's workplace differ from, and are far less than, one's expectations of
privacy in one's home." Privacy, home, and the family are closely intertwined
with intimacy, and the Court focuses on intimacy as a particular distinguishing
56 See infra Part IV.
11 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 n.4 (1961) (citation omitted).
ss See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) ("Property used for commercial
purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential property.
'An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed
less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home.'" (quoting New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 700 (1987))); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) ("[T]he privacy
interests of government employees in their place of work . . . are far less than those found at
home or in some other contexts."); City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (follow-
ing Ortega and assuming employee had limited expectation of privacy in text messages sent
on employer-issued pager); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) ("The greater
latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the
expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs
significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home .... "); Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (holding that while a private home is normally "accorded the full
range of Fourth Amendment protections,. . . [where a] home is converted into a commercial
center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that busi-
ness is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or
on the street.").
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aspect of the private sphere that warrants special protection from governmental
intrusion. For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,59 the Court
concluded that "[t]he intimate activities associated with family privacy and the
home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas . . . of a manufac-
turing plant,"60 despite Dow's elaborate 24/7 security around the perimeter of
the complex to prevent ground-level public views of these areas and its efforts
to preclude low-level flights by aircraft over the facility. Likewise, in Oliver v.
United States,61 the majority focused on the fact that "open fields do not pro-
vide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to
shelter from government interference. . . ."62
In contrast, Justice Marshall's focus on intimate activity led him to character-
ize privately owned secluded open woods and fields as part of the protected
private sphere.63 Similarly, in California v. Greenwood,' he joined Justice
Brennan in criticizing the majority for focusing on the location of trash bags on
the public street and their exposure for prying eyes, rather than on their highly
intimate and personal content. The Greenwood dissent emphasized that a trash
bag
"is a common repository for one's personal effects" and . . . is "there-
fore . . . inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy." . . . A
search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details
about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through
desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can
divulge the target's financial and professional status, political affiliations
and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic in-
terests. It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evi-
dence of the "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life,'" which the Fourth Amendment is de-
signed to protect.65
While the Justices often disagree about the extent of intimacy involved in a
particular case, they do agree on the appropriateness of intimacy as a constitu-
s9 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
60 Id. at 236.
61 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
62 Id. at 179.
63 Id. at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Privately owned woods and fields that are not
exposed to public view regularly are employed in a variety of ways that society acknowl-
edges deserve privacy. Many landowners like to take solitary walks on their property, confi-
dent that they will not be confronted in their rambles by strangers or policemen. Others
conduct agricultural businesses on their property. Some landowners use their secluded
spaces to meet lovers, others to gather together with fellow worshippers, still others to en-
gage in sustained creative endeavor.") (footnote omitted).
64 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
65 Id. at 50-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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tionally relevant, even central factor. 6 For example, in Wilson v. Layne,67 a
case dealing with media presence during the execution of an arrest warrant in
petitioners' home, the privacy and intimacy associated with the home are ex-
plicitly relevant to the Court's conclusion that the media's presence in this case
violated the Fourth Amendment.6' Furthermore, beyond the physical bounda-
ries of the home, intimacy is even more so intertwined with one's "effects" and
"persons." On several occasions the Court declared that purses are special con-
tainers because they are typically repositories of highly personal items and in-
evitably associated with an expectation of privacy. 69 In another frequently liti-
gated area-the testing of urine samples for drugs-the Court reiterated the
extremely private nature of excretory functions.70
66 A lone voice of criticism of the Court's emphasis on intimacy as deserving special
protections by the Fourth Amendment is found in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in
Florida v. Riley:
Perhaps the most remarkable passage in the plurality opinion is its suggestion that the
case might be a different one had any "intimate details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage [been] observed." What, one wonders, is meant by "intimate de-
tails"? If the police had observed Riley embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse,
would we then say that his reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed?
Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant for imposing a
requirement that the activity observed must be "intimate" in order to be protected by the
Constitution?
488 U.S. 445, 463 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
67 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
68 Id. at 614. In reviewing the facts of the case, the Court particularly notes that the
officers and the media entered the house in the early morning hours, when petitioners were
still in bed, Charles Wilson thereafter confronting the police dressed only in a pair of briefs,
and Geraldine Wilson next entering the living room wearing only a nightgown. Id. at 607.
69 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("Purses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal items that peo-
ple generally like to keep with them at all times. So I am tempted to say that a search of a
purse involves an intrusion so similar to a search of one's person that the same rule should
govern both."); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 355 n.1 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature.
Especially for shy or sensitive adolescents, it could prove extremely embarrassing for a
teacher or principal to rummage through its contents, which could include notes from
friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, and items of personal
hygiene."); id. at 375 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The search of a young wo-
man's purse by a school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of
privacy. A purse is a common repository for one's personal effects and therefore is inevita-
bly associated with the expectation of privacy.") (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
762 (1979)).
70 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) ("There
are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most
people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally
performed without public observation." (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
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Similarly, in a decision concerning a 'strip search' of a 13-year-old female
student by two school officials on suspicion that she brought forbidden pre-
scription and over-the-counter medications to school," both the majority and
the minority opinions (with the exception of Justice Thomas) emphasized the
patent intrusiveness into the privacy of the student by requiring her to pull her
bra and underpants away from her body, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic
area to some degree.72 Consequently, the Justices held the search unreasonable
and in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but disagreed on whether to extend
qualified immunity to the school officials in the § 1983 suit.73 The discussion
surrounding the issue of qualified immunity, this Article will argue later,"
sheds light on the real issue in this case: unbridled discretion and abuse of
authority rather than intrusion of one's privacy or proprietary interests.
C. Constructing Privacy-Conflating the Dichotomies
The Court's cases reveal a multilayered construction of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment: privacy as a substantive right to be left alone from govern-
mental intrusions; privacy as denoting a zone of physical and psychic seclusion
Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987))); id. at 625 ("We recognize ... that the procedures
for collecting the necessary [urine] samples . . . require employees to perform an excretory
function traditionally shielded by great privacy. . . ."); id. at 645-47 ((Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("Urination is among the most private of activities. It is generally forbidden in public,
eschewed as a matter of conversation, and performed in places designed to preserve this
tradition of personal seclusion. . . . As [Professor Fried] has written: '[I]n our culture the
excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so much so that situations
in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely distressing, as detracting from
one's dignity and self esteem.'" (citing Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487
(1968))); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 672-73 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
72 Id. at 379-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 381-82
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But cf Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
In Florence, the Court addressed a more intrusive strip search (involving close observa-
tion of private areas of a person's body) of an individual arrested for a minor offence during
the processing into the corrections facility. The majority did not discuss the individual's
privacy interest or the search's intrusiveness and held that the search procedures at the deten-
tion facility struck a reasonable balance between the inmate's privacy and the institutional
security needs. Id. at 1523. The four dissenting Justices, on the other hand, viewed that
search as constituting a serious invasion of the individual's privacy, which is "demeaning,
dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repul-
sive, signifying degradation and submission." Id. at 1526 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (citing Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d
1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983)).
73 Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
74 See infra Part III.
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and intimacy and excluding that which is beyond its boundaries as public and
impersonal; and the home and the family as sites of privacy in contrast to the
public sphere of the marketplace and commercial relationships. These concepts
often conflate, inextricably construing and being constructed by each other.
For example, the Court's analysis in Kyllo v. United States,7 5 a case condemn-
ing the warrantless thermal imaging of petitioner's home, explicitly tied togeth-
er all the noted dichotomies. First, the Court observed that "in the case of the
search of the interior of homes-the prototypical . . . area of protected priva-
cy-there is a ready criterion . . . of the minimal expectation of privacy that
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable."76 Second, "[i]n the home,
our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes."7 In contrast, the Kyllo Court distinguished
Dow Chemical because the latter case involved a non-private industrial com-
plex."
III. DECONSTRUCTING PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
A. The False Dichotomization of the Public and the Private Spheres
Framing Fourth Amendment protections in terms of private property and pri-
vacy interests is problematic not only as applied but on a conceptual level. In
light of the predominance of the public-private dichotomy and of privacy in
legal and social discourse, it not surprising that the public-private dichotomy
has been central to feminist writing and political struggle.79 The line between
the private and the public has several distinct meanings within feminist theo-
ry.s While this article focuses on deconstructing the public-private dichotomy
altogether, it is worth briefly mentioning other lines of feminist critique of pri-
vacy that carry potential implications to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
One line of feminist critique focuses on the "state action" doctrine. In this
context, the public-private distinction denotes the scope of constitutionally rele-
vant exercise of power so that public actions trigger constitutional inquiry and
private actions do not.81 Moreover, the state action doctrine embodies the view
that the government best promotes freedoms when it does not intervene (inac-
tion) in the status quo,82 and therefore the government is under no affirmative
7 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
76 Id. at 34.
7 Id. at 37.
78 Id.
79 Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (S. I. Benn & Gerald Gaus eds., 1983).
80 See generally Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist
Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (2000).
81 Id. at 848.
82 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-52 (3d ed. 2009). As
Louis Michael Seidman notes, "[i]n our tradition of negative constitutionalism, the Constitu-
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duty to guarantee one's enjoyment of constitutional liberties. In fact, as
Fourth Amendment cases demonstrate, if the government tries to intervene in
the private conduct, it will itself be regarded as violating the constitutional
mandate. 84 Feminist scholars have challenged the two ways in which the state
action doctrine defines the public-private boundary. Some focus on the state
component of the state action doctrine and criticize the lack of constitutional
constraints on the exercise of private power.85 Other scholars focus on the ac-
tion constrains the governmental sphere, but never the private sphere. When the government
acts, it thus risks violating constitutional norms. The Constitution, however, virtually never
regulates private conduct or requires that the government act." Louis Michael Seidman,
Making the Best of Fourth Amendment Law: A Comment on the Distribution of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1296, 1296-97 (1999).
83 Thus, for example, the Court has strongly rejected the argument that the Constitution
provides a positive right to police protection. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (finding no responsibility on the part of the state
child protection agency for a permanent injury caused by abuse of a child of which it was
aware).
84 This ideology is central for the construction of privacy in general and in search and
seizure law in particular. As Justice Brandeis put it, the right to be let alone is "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued," and hence, in order to protect that right
"every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government . . . must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). The Court in Wolf similarly emphasized that one's privacy is secured from
police intrusion, so that security in, and of, the private sphere is achieved through non-
intervention by the state. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev'd on other grounds,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
85 See e.g. Becker, supra note 3 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment neither gives wo-
men security in their homes from their husbands nor ensures that the government treat mari-
tal rape like other rapes and assaults, as part of a more general argument that the Bill of
Rights does less to solve the problems of women and non-propertied men than to solve the
problems of men of property, especially white men of property). Higgins, supra note 80, at
858-59 (arguing that women should also be protected against private violence and that the
state should have a duty to protect women against such violence); RoBIN WEST, PROGRES-
SIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 58 (1994) (us-
ing marital rape exemptions to advance a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause as encompassing the state's denial of protection to women from
private violence); Cf Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World without Privacy, 81
Miss. L.J. 1309 (2012) (exploring the rise of private surveillance and the police ability to
simply obtain such data from private actors in a word of declining Fourth Amendment priva-
cy).
MacKinnon's critique of the state provides a particularly enlightening challenge to the
entire distinction between state power and private power. According to MacKinnon, the
state institutionalizes male power over women through institutionalizing the male point of
view as law. Consequently, state (legal) power is male power, and the social power of men
over women gains legitimacy as the power of the state. Once we recognize that state power
and (private) male power are indistinguishable, the normative and analytical usefulness of
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86tion requirement and argue that ignoring inaction reinforces private power.
Finally, others challenge the public-private distinction altogether, arguing that
the state actually determines what is public and what is private.
Rather than focusing on where and how we draw the public-private line,
some feminist scholars, including myself, question the public-private dichoto-
my altogether and reject the notion of sharp demarcation between public and
private. Elizabeth Schneider states: "There is no realm of personal and family
life that exists totally separate from the reach of the state. The state defines
both the family, the so-called private sphere, and the market, the so-called pub-
lic sphere. 'Private' and 'public' exist on a continuum."8 Similarly, Deborah
Rhode argues that empirically, the dichotomy of separate spheres has always
been illusory." The state determines what counts as private and what forms of
intimacy deserve public recognition. Public opportunities and policies concern-
ing tax, welfare, and childcare shape private choices just as private family con-
siderations constrain public participation in the workplace.89
Frances Olsen has consistently argued that the public-private dichotomy is
false and that the state is constantly implicated in the private sphere.90 She
illustrates this point by focusing on state intervention in the family, arguing that
the terms intervention and nonintervention, are largely meaningless.9' Because
the state is implicated in the formation, functioning, and distribution of power
within the family, it is meaningless to ask whether the state does or does not
the state action requirement no longer exists, since state action can be characterized as pri-
vate action and vice versa. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 169-70.
86 Tracy Higgins, for example, argues that the notion that the state promotes freedom
when it does not intervene in the status quo entrenches "existing hierarchies of private power
while simultaneously reinforcing the equation of private action with freedom." Higgins,
supra note 80, at 860-61; see also MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 187 ("It is apparently a
very short step from that in which the government has a duty not to intervene, to that in
which it has no duty to intervene.").
In the context of search and seizure law, Louis Michael Seidman similarly argues that
negative constitutionalism constrains redistribution and reinforces the status quo of wealth
and power. He offers the example of a drug- and violence-ridden public housing project,
and suggests that to truly make the residents "secure" the government must act, such as
through random police searches of apartments for weapons and drugs authorized by a major-
ity vote of the housing project residents. Hence, it is "the failure of police to conduct
searches and seizures that [should be] constitutionally problematic." Louis Michael Seid-
man, The Problems with Privacy's Problems, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1079, 1093 (1995).
87 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 977 (1991).
88 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1994).
89 Id.
90 See Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105, 113 (1988)
[hereinafter Olsen, Unraveling Compromise]; Olsen, supra note 11, at 842-44, 862; Frances
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983) [hereinafter, Olsen, The Family and the Market].
91 Olsen, supra note 11, at 842.
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intervene in the family.92 On the other hand, the use of the terms intervention
and nonintervention masks the policy choices the state is making.93 According
to Olsen, the state is not a neutral arbiter when dealing with the family; which-
ever family status quo the state chooses to support, its choice is a political
choice that impacts the family power dynamics. 94
Consequently, after exposing the malleability of the public-private distinc-
tion, one comes to the realization that the state should not be allowed to justify
unjust actions and policies based on an imaginary public-private line,95 in the
context of the Fourth Amendment or otherwise.
B. The False Dichotomy of the Marketplace versus Home and Family
The different lines of feminist critique of the state action doctrine and the
public-private dichotomy tie in with feminist critique of the conception of pri-
vacy in general, as demarcating a substantive zone of personal privacy protect-
ed from state regulation. This type of critique mostly focuses on two variations
of privacy doctrine: decisional privacy in a sense of agency and personal auton-
omy, 96 and spatial privacy related to the sanctity of home and family. 97 The
latter, as we have seen, is central to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Feminist critics have challenged the use of the public-private divide to di-
chotomize the home and the family against the marketplace. This critique is
particularly significant to Fourth Amendment cases, where the outcome often
turns on this latter dichotomy. Olsen, for example, focuses on the distinction
between the privateness of families (women's sphere) and the publicness of
markets (men's sphere).98 The dichotomization of market and family pervades
our discourse and our culture to the extent that we tend to forget that our family
and market arrangements are a human creation.99 Thus, we must reject the
family-market dichotomy in order to resolve real conflicts."
Some recognition of the falsity of the home/market dichotomy and a step
towards the dismantling of the private sphere versus public sphere dichotomy is
reflected in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega.'o'
92 Id. at 837, 842.
93 See id. at 985 ("Although social failure to respond to problems of battered women has
been justified on grounds of privacy, this failure to respond is an affirmative political deci-
sion that has serious public consequences. The rationale of privacy masks the political na-
ture of the decision.").
94 Id. at 843.
95 Olsen, supra note 12, at 324-25.
96 The issue of agency and personal autonomy is discussed in Raigrodski, supra note 6.
9 See infra notes 145-157 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 90.
9 Id. at 1569.
100 Id. at 1577.
101 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 733-48 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
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In Ortega, the Court acknowledged that the legitimate privacy interests of pub-
lic employees in the private objects they bring to the workplace may be sub-
stantial,102 but went on to hold that the employee can simply leave personal
belongings at home.'o3 By treating work and home as fully separate the Court
thus assumed a bright line demarcating the private sphere from the market. In
contrast, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, portrayed a different reality. He ob-
served that:
It is, unfortunately, all too true that the workplace has become another
home for most working Americans. . . . Consequently, an employee's
private life must intersect with the workplace, for example, when the em-
ployee takes advantage of work or lunch breaks to make personal tele-
phone calls, to attend to personal business, or to receive personal visitors
in the office. As a result, the tidy distinctions (to which the plurality al-
ludes) between the workplace and professional affairs, on the one hand,
and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do not exist
in reality. . . . Thus, the plurality's remark that the "employee may avoid
exposing personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home"
reveals on the part of the Members of the plurality a certain insensitivity to
the "operational realities of the workplace" they so value.'0
Not surprisingly, the complexity of women's lives and the challenge wo-
men's lives pose to traditional boundaries play a central role in exposing the
myth of the separate private and public spheres. Justice Blackmun went on to
acknowledge this in an elaborate footnote:
Perhaps the greatest sign of the disappearance of the distinction between
work and private life is the fact that women-the traditional representa-
tives of the private sphere and family life-have entered the work force in
increasing numbers. . . . "The myth of 'separate worlds'-one of work
and the other of family life-has been effectively laid to rest. Their insep-
arability is undeniable, particularly as two-earner families have become
the norm where they once were the exception and as a distressing number
of single parents are required to raise children on their own. The import of
work-family conflicts-for the family, for the workplace, and, indeed, for
the whole of society-will grow as these demographic and social transfor-
mations in the roles of men and women come to be more fully clarified
and appreciated."'
The malleability of the public-private distinction and the patriarchal ideology
that drives it are exposed in cases manifesting attributes of both spheres. In
102 Id. at 721.
103 Id. at 725.
'" Id. at 739-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 740 n.6 (quoting BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT: WORK & FAMI-
LY: A CHANGING DYNAMIC 217 (1986) (remarks of Professor Phyllis Moen)).
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these cases, this Article argues, the fact that the Court is making a conscious
ideological choice in relegating the issue at hand to one sphere over the other
becomes apparent. These choices are not mandated by some inherent logic of
the dichotomies. Yet, the Court in these cases consistently emphasizes the pub-
lic sphere attributes over the private sphere attributes, and in doing so it per-
petuates male ideology. To demonstrate this argument, let us take a closer look
at Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 06 Minnesota v. Carter,0 7 California v.
Carney,o8 and Vernonia School District v. Acton.' 09
In Dow Chemical, the Court declared that open industrial areas fall between
open fields and curtilage."o On the one hand, a "commercial facility enjoys
certain protections under the Fourth Amendment,""' and "Dow plainly ha[d] a
reasonable . . . expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered build-
ings. . ."ll2 Indeed, Dow took significant measures not to expose the inner
manufacturing areas to the public (at least from the ground)."" On the other
hand, the Court found it important that the disputed area was not "immediately
adjacent to a private home,"" 4 but rather to a commercial property."s The
Court emphasized the area's exposure to public viewing from the air,"'6 and the
failure of surveillance photographs to reveal intimate details."' The Court
summarily concluded that,
[T]he open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous plant struc-
tures spread over an area of 2,000 acres are not analogous to the "curti-
lage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance; such an industrial
complex is more comparable to an open field and as such it is open to the
view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace
immediately above or sufficiently near the area for the reach of cam-
eras.118
Why the area was more comparable to an open field than to the home's
curtilage is not clear. However, it is clear that the Court chose at the end to
emphasize the public sphere attributes of the case rather than the private sphere
ones it observed earlier." 9 This choice was not mandated by the facts of the
106 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
107 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
1os 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
109 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
o Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 236.
'' Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
112 Id. at 236.
"13 Id.
114 Id. at 237 n.4.
"s Id. at 237-38.
116 Id. at 238.
117 Id.
"1 Id. at 239.
"9 Indeed, Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found that the
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case or by any inherent logic of the public-private dichotomy. Once relegated
to the public sphere, however, it naturally followed that "the taking of aerial
photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace [was] not a
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment."1 20
Carterl21 presented a direct clash between the home and the market. This
clash required the Court to manipulate the public-private dichotomy in order to
exclude a particular home from the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The
home, which is otherwise treated as the paradigmatic private sphere, is sudden-
ly, in Carter, characterized as a public marketplace and denied the protections
of the Fourth Amendment. 122 The respondents, Carter and Johns, were sitting
with Kimberly Thompson in the kitchen of her ground-floor apartment, bag-
ging cocaine.123 While so engaged, they were observed by a police officer,
who looked through a gap in a closed window blind, based on an informant's
tip.124 While Thompson, who was not a party in the case, was the lessee of the
apartment, "Carter and Johns lived in Chicago and had come to the apartment
for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine." 25 They had never been to the
apartment before and were only in the apartment for approximately 2 1/2 hours.
In return for the use of the apartment, they gave Thompson 1/8 of an ounce of
the cocaine. 12 Absent any suggestion that Carter and Johns had a previous
relationship with Thompson, or that there was any other social purpose to their
visit, the Court characterized their conduct as purely commercial, thus holding
that "[w]hile the apartment was a dwelling place for Thompson, it was for these
respondents simply a place to do business." 27 Consequently, they had no ex-
pectation of privacy in the apartment and no Fourth Amendment right.' 28 How-
ever, the facts can as easily be read to support an assertion of some social
relationship between the woman and the two men. Absent further testimony
from Kimberly Thompson, we cannot know the nature of her relationships with
either one or both men. Maybe she received the cocaine as a friend, or even as
a sexual partner.
The Court's precedents acknowledge that private social relationships deserve
Fourth Amendment protection, especially if the home is involved. In contrast,
the public marketplace does not involve similar privacy considerations, so the
Dow facility resembled neither an "open field" nor a "curtilage," and criticized the Court for
applying these doctrines without any convincing explanation. Id. at 250-51 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120 Id. at 239.
121 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
122 Id. at 90-91.
123 Id. at 85.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 86.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 90.
128 Id. at 91.
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protections of the Fourth Amendment do not apply. The Court's dichotomized
public-private discourse allows only for these two opposite choices. Hence, in
order to justify the denial of Fourth Amendment protection in Carter, the Court
had to artificially impose market attributes on the relationships and on the
home. Consequently, the home lost its special protection as the ultimate zone
of privacy.
In California v. Carney,'2 9 the search of a parked mobile home presents a
unique example of the conflation and falsity of the public-private and the
home-market dichotomies. Moreover, these dichotomies also conflate with the
concept of intimacy, which itself turns out to be malleable by the Court. In this
case, not only does the home-the paradigmatic zone of protected privacy-
take on attributes of the market, but sex-the paradigmatic zone of protected
intimacy-also presents a commercial fagade. As in Carter, the home was
used for a drug transaction, in which marijuana was exchanged for sexual con-
tact between Charles Carney and a male youth. 3 o However, neither the com-
mercial function of the home nor the commercial aspect of the sex figured
explicitly into the Court's analysis. Instead, both the majority and the dissent
analyzed the case under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, dis-
agreeing on whether a mobile home is more like a home or more like a vehicle.
The majority conceded that respondent's vehicle possessed some, if not
many, of the attributes of a home.13 ' Nonetheless, for the majority, it clearly
fell within the scope of the vehicle exception. 3 2 Respondent's motor home
was readily mobile, and it "was so situated that an objective observer would
conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle." 33 As with
the dual-faced open industrial area in Dow, nothing inherent in the public-pri-
vate dichotomy required the Court to relegate the motor home to the public
(vehicular) sphere rather than to the private (home) sphere or vice versa. And
as in the previous two cases, by placing the motor home within the public
domain the Court prevented the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.
Alternatively, rather than focusing on these vehicular attributes to determine
that the motor home was not being used as a home, the majority could have
emphasized the commercial nature of the transaction as it did in Carter. How-
ever, unlike Carter, here it was the homeowner himself, not the visitor, whose
privacy interest was implicated. Consequently, the home-market dichotomy
could not provide the Court with the normative justification it needed. Moreo-
ver, the use of the home for commercial purposes rather than as a residence is
not clear cut, since the activity taking place inside the home was sex and not
drug distribution. Of course, the Court could have resolved that ambiguity by
129 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
130 Id. at 388.
131 Id. at 393.
132 Id. at 393.
133 Id. at 393.
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emphasizing the apparent commercial nature of the sexual conduct under the
circumstances. However, this would have required the Court to collapse the
divide between the intimate/personal and the public/commercial. Again, the
Court would have been left without supposedly normative grounds to justify a
value-laden political choice. The dissent also chose to ignore the presence of
the most private and intimate activity typically occurring in one's home, rely-
ing, instead, on the parking location and interior design of the mobile home to
regard it as a home rather than a vehicle.134
Finally, in Vernonia School District v. Acton,' 3 5 the Court highlighted the
unavoidable public aspects of an otherwise extremely private intimate activity,
rather than following its own rhetoric of valuing privacy and intimacy. First it
concluded that,
[s]chool sports are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before
each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public
school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for
the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical: No
individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up along a
wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toilet
stalls have doors. . . . there is "an element of 'communal undress' inherent
in athletic participation." 136
Next the Court declared that "[w]e recognized in Skinner that collecting the
samples for urinalysis intrudes upon 'an excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy.'" 37 However, the conditions under which male stu-
dents and female students produced the urine samples were nearly identical to
those typically encountered in public restrooms.138 Hence, the privacy interests
compromised by the process of obtaining the urine samples were negligible, in
the Court's opinion.'13  Yet again, when faced with a choice between the pri-
vate sphere and the public sphere, the Court chose to limit the scope of the
private sphere, and consequently to prevent the protections of the Fourth
Amendment from applying where they are most needed and theoretically justi-
fied.
Ironically, while the Acton Court utilized the public aspect of the school's
locker rooms to undermine the otherwise extreme privacy and intimacy associ-
ated with undress and excretory functions, it recently opted to differentiate the
134 Id. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
136 Id. at 657 (citation omitted).
137 Id. at 658 (citation omitted).
138 Male students produced samples at a urinal along a wall. They remained fully clothed
and were only observed from behind, if at all. Female students produced samples in an
enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listening only for sounds of tamper-
ing. Id.
139 id
90 [Vol. 22:67
PROPERTY, PRIVACY & POWER
experience of nakedness or near undress when changing for gym, from the
exposure of one's body during a search.140 Privacy analysis and the public-
private distinction cannot explain that shift; rather, as we shall see, the Court
focuses on the frightening and degrading experience by the student as com-
pared to unchecked discretion and authority of the school officials.
C. The Devaluation of the "Female" Private Sphere
The Court's privacy rhetoric in its Fourth Amendment cases treasures the
private sphere. In practice, however, the Court constructs both the private
sphere and the public sphere in a way that eventually marginalizes the private
sphere. In Carter, the Court faced a conflict between the private sphere, repre-
sented by the home, and the public sphere, manifested in commercial activi-
ty. 14 ' The Court chose to relegate the entire scenario to the public sphere and
thereby to negate the private sphere attributes of the case. 14 2 The Court could
have easily gone the opposite direction, as in Dow, emphasizing the private
sphere characteristics and negating the public sphere aspects. This would have
certainly been more true to the Court's overall Fourth Amendment rhetoric of
the superiority of the private sphere over the public sphere. Acton and Carney
expose similar choices. In Acton, the conflict between the private sphere, as
represented in the intimate activities such as urination or undressing, and the
public sphere, as represented by the plain view of others in the locker rooms
and bathrooms, is resolved in favor of the public sphere.14 3 In Carney, the
conflict between the private sphere, doubly represented by the home and by
sexual intercourse, and the public sphere, represented by the commercial nature
of the sex-for-drugs exchange, is again resolved in favor of the public sphere,
without even examining the conflict between the spheres."
From a feminist perspective, the results of these four cases and the denigra-
tion of the private sphere they exemplify are not surprising. The public-private
divide is deeply associated with the meaning of gender itself-the public being
ascribed to the realm of men, and the private to women.145 On its face, the
private sphere-embodied in the home, family, and intimacy-is valued and
treasured, both in general and in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However,
feminists have long argued that the legal rhetoric of preferring the private
sphere is disingenuous, and serves only as an attempt to pacify women to pre-
vent their rebellion against their marginalization and oppression in the private
140 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009).
141 See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
142 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998).
143 See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 658.
14 See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
145 Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN's L.J.
47, 61 (1997).
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sphere of home and family. 14 6 The private sphere is elevated only as long as it
serves male interests.
Even more so, the division of the world into separate public and private
spheres facilitates the oppression of women. 14 7 The constitutional protection of
the home and the family maintains the relegation of women to the (protective)
private sphere. At the same time, the parallel exclusion of women from the
public sphere makes them dependent on men, both diminishing women's power
and amplifying men's power within the private sphere.148 Thus, "privacy func-
tions as a veneer that obscures the sexual oppression of women by protecting
and simultaneously disempowering them in an isolated sphere." 49 Especially
with regards to the embodiment of the private sphere in the home and the fami-
ly, feminists have argued that privacy doctrine "shelters from state regulation a
domain in which women have unequal power and are physically vulnerable."s 0
As MacKinnon observed: "The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a
sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the
distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse,""' including battery, rape,
and exploited labor.'52 Therefore, women should recognize that invocations of
the value of privacy as good for women may in fact perpetuate their oppression
and isolation.'
At the same time, some feminist scholars, especially African American femi-
nists, have criticized the feminist tendency to portray the private sphere as a
locus of subordination for all women, regardless of race and class.154 Joan
Williams argues that some feminists' imagery of the family as the locus of
subordination seems most convincing to women otherwise privileged by class
and race; to working-class women, the family may seem as a haven against the
injuries of class.15 5 Similarly, many African American women do not share
some white feminists' assumptions about the oppressiveness of the family or
about the homemaker role, but rather see the family and unpaid domestic work
as a form of both protection from and resistance to the oppressions of racism.156
146 See Gavison, supra note 13, at 25-27.
147 Miller, supra note 3, at 882.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Higgins, supra note 80, at 850.
"5 MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 168.
152 CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES IN LIFE AND LAW
101 (1987).
'5 Id. at 101-02.
154 See, e.g., Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context
of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42 (1988); Joan Williams, Implementing Antiessen-
tialism: How Gender Wars Turn Into Race and Class Conflict, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
41 (1999).
'ss Williams, supra note 154, at 55-57.
156 Id. at 68-69.
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Deborah King further observes that while domesticity has been viewed as op-
pressive from the standpoint of white middle-class feminists, the option not to
work outside of the home may be desired and viewed as a privilege by black
low-income women.' The question therefore becomes how to separate good
privacy from bad privacy.
IV. FROM PRIVACY TO POWER
Even assuming we can meaningfully distinguish private power from state
power, action from non-action, and the private sphere from the public sphere-
the question remains how to separate good privacy from bad privacy. Rather
than simply favoring state power over private power, or vice versa, we need to
"recognize their differences and to theorize more carefully about the kind of
threats each may pose,"5 8 which may or may not have anything to do with
privacy. Moreover, designating something as either private or public, or allo-
cating it either to the private sphere or to the public sphere, does not solve the
core issues. It does not guarantee security against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Hence, two fundamental and interrelated questions present them-
selves within the context of the Fourth Amendment. First, should a feminist
theory of the Fourth Amendment try to reclaim privacy or should we shift our
focus elsewhere? And second, is the Fourth Amendment really all about priva-
cy?l59
This Article argues that the core issue underlying the Fourth Amendment is
power-power that within our current jurisprudence is "everywhere therefore
nowhere, diffuse rather than pervasively hegemonic."' 60 The concept of priva-
cy and the public-private split are merely instrumental to the fundamental is-
sues of patriarchal power and social control that underlie them. As Frances
Olsen writes, "[s]truggles over power inform, fuel, and permeate the debate
over the public/private dichotomy."' 61 Rosa Ehrenreich further observes how
power and privacy not only overlap but construct one another and are intimate-
ly bound up with each other.' 62 In fact, "without privacy, power could not
sustain itself; and without power, privacy could not exist." 63 Consequently, the
' King, supra note 154, at 71 ("[T]he option not to work outside of the home is a luxury
that historically has been denied most black women.").
158 Higgins, supra note 80, at 864.
1 Cf Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen? 94 COLUM. L. Rav. 1751, 1754 (1994) ("Might reliance
upon privacy as the standard weight of the Fourth Amendment no longer provide, by itself,
an adequate measure for assessing the propriety of government intrusions? Is making privacy
the centerpiece of the debate over the 'reasonableness' of a specific intrusion skewing the
very values the Amendment is designed to protect?").
160 MAcKINNON, supra note 5, at 131.
161 Olsen, supra note 12, at 320.
162 Ehrenreich, supra note 3, at 2058.
163 Id.
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private sphere is intertwined with social power: "Power constructs privacy and,
to maintain itself, power also destroys privacy.""
In particular, the public-private dichotomy is fueled by the power hierarchy
between men and women. Olsen argues that the reasons we value privacy are
deeply related to the subordination of women: "Privacy is most enjoyed by
those with power. To the powerless, the private realm is frequently a sphere
not of freedom but of uncertainty and insecurity." 65 It is not that men are the
only ones in the family who enjoy privacy,16 6 but that the enjoyment of privacy
depends on hierarchy.167 I would go further to say that with respect to search
and seizure in the United States, it is gender, race and class that animate the
intersection of privacy and power.168 In general, those who have power control
what is and what is not private. It is no accident, observes Ehreneich, that
"absolute power demands absolute privacy for itself and zero privacy for
others, for this is a crucial part of how those with power maintain their power
and destroy that of others." 6 9 While not as apparent as in totalitarian regimes,
even societies built upon respect to human rights resort to denial of privacy as a
means of social control.vo
When the ideology and rhetoric of privacy are exposed as an ideology of
male power and social control, we may see that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are directed against the exploit of such power and abusive mani-
festations of control. Within this broader scheme, violations of one's property
rights and privacy interests are only two of many manifestations of the web of
social powers against which we seek protection. '1 Neither intrusion on one's
property interests or privacy interests are the exclusive ways in which the gov-
ernment can exert power and control over an individual. Nonetheless, this Arti-
cle argues, it is these power abuses that have received so much attention in
16 Id.
65 Olsen, supra note 12, at 325.
166 Id. at 325-26.
167 Id. at 325-26.
168 Ehrenreich, supra note 3, at 2059.
169 Id. at 2060 (citing Louise Marie Roth, The Right to Privacy Is Political: Power, the
Boundary Between Public and Private, and Sexual Harassment, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 45,
68 (1999) ("The more powerful are always more able to define and defend the boundary
between public and private in their lives.")).
170 Id. at 2060 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
171 Cf Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like
Privacy: An Examination of the "Mosaic Theory" and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment,
24 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 169, 177-78 (2012) (observing that the Court in Boyd v. United
States, an 1886 case considered to begin the modern era of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, viewed governmental invasion on one's home to be only one concrete manifestation
of the real danger-the use of state power to infringe on individual liberties).
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because (and when) they implicate the inter-
ests of white, educated men.
Hence, in envisioning a feminist Fourth Amendment we need to acknowl-
edge the multiple ways in which the state manifests power over individuals
beyond notions of property, privacy or physical force. We need to focus on the
power webs of gender, class, and race that enable the police and the state to
subordinate individuals in seemingly non-abusive ways. In a nutshell, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence should shift from a paradigm of privacy or property
to a paradigm of power and domination.
A. Criticizing the Exclusivity of the Fourth Amendment Privacy and
Property Discourse
The dominant paradigms of the Fourth Amendment have focused on the abil-
ity of individuals to preserve their proprietary interests and to shelter some
aspects of their lives from the government, especially within the confines of
their homes. However, neither the Court's privacy analysis nor its resurrected
property-based trespass analysis are able to keep up with advances in electronic
or other novel modes of government surveillance. Governments are increasing-
ly capable of monitoring individuals without any physical intrusion on property
interest, and by doing so, ironically, are impacting and shaping expectations of
privacy in society as well.172 But are we really willing to allow the state to
freely infringe on our security just because it may not involve our property or
implicate perceived privacy interests? As Justice Sotomayor observed in her
concurring opinion in Unites States v. Jones, unrestrained governmental power
to collect data on the individual's private comings and goings is prone to
abuse.'73 If we allow the government at its own discretion to track its citizens,
it may "alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society."' 74
Moreover, in reality, most of what the police do does not entail intruding on
one's property or informational privacy with house searches or wiretaps."'
Street encounters and traffic stops, for example, may involve other sorts of
harm, such as physical security and personal dignity, which may not be cap-
172 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
962-63 (Alito, J., concurring).
" Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)).
175 See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1061 (1995). See also John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the
Fourth Amendment, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 655, 660 (2008) (arguing that privacy alone does not
capture several core values that underlie the Fourth Amendment, primarily human dignity);
Thomas Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2009) (critiquing the exclusive focus on privacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and suggesting we re-orient our focus on protecting interpersonal liberty).
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tured by the law's focus on property and informational privacy.'7 6 Ironically,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Jones, seems to suggest that in order
for it to be a "search," the government must be seeking information or trying to
find something: "A trespass on 'houses' or 'effects,' or a Katz invasion of pri-
vacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the
obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a
trespass or invasion of privacy.""' And yet, if government agents merely ran-
sack someone's house to achieve submission and silence opponents, regardless
of what information they would find, I doubt that Justice Scalia or the framers
of the Fourth Amendment wouldn't find this a prohibited search.178
The Court's jurisprudence includes partial acknowledgement that something
else is at stake beyond informational privacy interests. In Terry v. Ohio, for
example, the Court emphasized that
it is simply fantastic to urge that [a careful exploration of the outer sur-
faces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty indigni-
ty." It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly.'79
Consequently, even a limited search of the outer clothing "constitutes a se-
vere, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must sure-
ly be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience. "10 Hence,
it would seem that securing the individual's bodily integrity and personal digni-
ty from unreasonable governmental intrusion is also at stake and within the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, these important interests
occupy only an ancillary place in search and seizure law, which continues to
focus on privacy in general and informational privacy in particular.
A sample from the Court's cases exemplifies the inability of either the prop-
erty-based or privacy-based frameworks, and particularly the treatment of an
16 As William Stuntz observes, in reality, "[hiouse searches turn out not to be so para-
digmatic after all." Stuntz, supra note 175, at 1062.
17 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5.
178 It is reported that James Otis in his argument in the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case
referenced a case by the name of Walley v. Ware. As described, in Walley v. Ware, a magis-
trate questioned Ware, a customs official, on several suspected charges. In retaliation, Ware
demanded to search the magistrate's home for uncustomed goods without even pretending
there was suspicion of contraband goods to justify the search. See Thomas K. Clancy, The
Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 994
(2011) (citing JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPE-
RIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSErrs BAY, BETWEEN 1761
AND 1772 476 n.29, 490 (1865)).
179 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
1so Id. at 24-25.
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intrusion to one's home as the paradigmatic Fourth Amendment violation, to
redress and curb police conduct that inherently involves exertion of coercive
state power: Illinois v. Caballes dealt with a dog "sniff;""' Arizona v. Gant
concerned a search-incident-to-arrest of a motor-vehicle;' 82 Georgia v. Ran-
dolph dealt with a warrantless search of a home despite the express objection of
the resident;'83 and lastly, Los Angeles County v. Rettele examined the execu-
tion of a valid search warrant to search a home.'" This Article argues, instead,
that a focus on the power hierarchies between the police and the individual
would have better explained the outcomes of those cases and may have even
altered the results. 85
In Caballes,186 the encounter began with a road-side traffic stop for speeding
conducted by one state trooper; the traffic stop then evolved into a dog "sniff'
of the vehicle for narcotics conducted by a state police drug interdiction team
officer arriving on the scene upon overhearing the radio transmission.' From
an implicated privacy interest standpoint, using a dog to detect illegal narcotics
as opposed to other personal hidden items does not implicate legitimate privacy
interests, and therefore does not rise to a constitutional violation of the Fourth
Amendment to begin with.' 8 Since the first instance of police conduct-
seizure of a person-was constitutionally justifiable (the speeding provides
probable cause), and the second instance of police conduct-warrantless search
of a vehicle-does not amount to a search within the meaning of a Fourth
Amendment concerned with privacy, the majority had no difficulty in rejecting
the constitutional claim. 9
In contrast, the dissenting justices pointed out that such jurisprudence leaves
unchecked "suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages
and pedestrians on sidewalks,"' 9o which can in fact be viewed by most people
as quite intrusive and as a hallmark of totalitarian regimes. As Justice Ginsburg
pointed out, a drug-detection dog is quite intimidating, and injecting it into a
traffic stop "changes the character of the encounter between the police and the
motorist," which becomes more adversarial, embarrassing and intimidating.19
In the 2009 Gant decision,192 the search of the interior of the car by the
181 543 U.S. 405, 405 (2005).
182 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
183 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
184 550 U.S. 609, 609 (2007).
1I See infra notes 325-349 and accompanying text.
186 543 U.S. at 405.
187 Id. at 405-06.
188 Id. at 409 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
189 Id. at 410.
190 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing).
19' Id. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
192 556 U.S. 332, 344-45 (2009).
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officers did implicate a legitimate privacy interest. The Court reiterated that
although the privacy interest in the vehicle is less substantial that in the home,
it is "nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection." 93
Constrained by its own privacy jurisprudence however, the Court struggled to
reclaim that important privacy interest in the car with the prior sanctioning of
searches-incident-to-arrest.
In Gant, a home visit based on an anonymous drug tip revealed that Gant
(not the owner of the home) had an outstanding arrest warrant for driving with
a suspended license. Later that evening, after observing Gant driving and park-
ing in the driveway, the four officers arrested Gant, handcuffed him and locked
him in the back of the patrol car.194 Two officers searched Gant's car and
found a gun and a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.1 95
One officer testified that they searched the car based on the search-incident-to-
arrest exception to the warrant requirement "[b]ecause the law says we can do
ic "196it."9
The Court was obviously troubled by the police conduct, as it held the search
unreasonable.197 The Court held that the original rationale of the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception does not apply if the arrestee has been secured and
cannot access the interior of the vehicle.' 98 At the same time, the Court intro-
duced a new justification to the exception, allowing a search of the vehicle for
evidence related to the crime.' 99 The Court pointed out that even under the new
justification a search of the vehicle such as the one here will likely be unreason-
able when incident to an arrest for a traffic violation.20 0 This new justification,
however, cannot be explained based on a privacy analysis, since presumably
the motorist's privacy interest in the personal artifacts inside the car does not
change based on the type of offense one is arrested for.
In fact, the Court's reasoning emphasizes the need to curb police power.
Constructing the rule broadly would merely provide "a police entitlement"-an
anathema to the Fourth Amendment:20'
A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search [of passenger
compartment as well as every purse or container within that space] when-
ever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense . . . creates a
serious and recurring threat . . [that] implicates the central concern under-
lying the Fourth Amendment-the concern about giving police officers
'9 Id. at 345.
194 Id. at 335.
1 Id. at 336.
196 Id. at 337.
1 Id. at 335.
I98 Id.
199 Id. at 343.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 347.
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unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private ef-
fects. 202
This Article's proposed framework of analysis would have confronted those
issues head on, while likely reaching the same result as the Court in this case.
Similarly, the lack of focus on the power relations between the police and the
individual in the context of home searches forces the Court in Georgia v. Ran-
dolph to draw afine line. This fine line exists somewhere between a constitu-
tionally permissible warrantless search of a home based on a co-tenant's con-
sent, where the individual is not actually there to object, and the
unconstitutionality of such a search, where the individual is there objecting to
it.203 Since there is no difference in the scope of the legitimate privacy expecta-
tion that the individual has in his home, there must be something else at play to
explain the different treatment and the drawing of the fine line. The Court,
however, offers no such explanation.
Focusing on protected privacy interests at the home was also insufficient to
address the scenario in Los Angeles County v. Rettele.204 In that case, police
officers executed a valid search warrant of a home, not knowing that it was sold
to Rettele, his girlfriend, and her 17-year-old son, none of whom was involved
in or suspected of any criminal activity for which the search warrant was is-
sued. Around 7 a.m., seven officers knocked on the door and announced their
presence. The police ordered the teenager who opened the door to lie face
down on the ground while they entered. The officers then went into Rettele's
bedroom, waking him and his girlfriend up. With guns drawn, police ordered
the couple to get out of bed and show their hands-despite the fact that neither
was dressed. Retelle and his girlfriend stood there naked for about two minutes
before they were allowed to put on robes and go into the living room to sit on
the couch.Within a few more minutes the officers realized their mistake, apolo-
gized, and left. Rettele, his girlfriend, and the teenager filed a § 1983 suit
claiming a violation of their constitutional rights.205
In a fairly brief opinion, the Court acknowledges that officers executing
search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in pri-
vate activity, leading to real frustration, humiliation and embarrassment, as was
the case here.206 Nonetheless, when the officers execute a valid warrant (which
will occasionally authorize the search of the innocent, and people like Rettele
and his companions unfortunately bear the cost) and act reasonably to protect
themselves (in this case, by drawing their weapons against the innocent and
preventing movement until premises were secure), the Fourth Amendment is
202 Id. at 345.
203 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
204 550 U.S. 609, 609 (2007).
205 Id. at 611-12.
206 Id. at 615-16.
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not violated.207 Here as well, privacy analysis alone should have justified the
utmost protection and recognition of the petitioners' constitutional rights; but
the justices may have rightfully sensed that this is not the kind of police con-
duct that the Fourth Amendment intended to curtail.
Leading Fourth Amendment scholars have indeed criticized the nearly exclu-
sive attention of search and seizure law on the protection of privacy, and partic-
ularly informational privacy. Advocating "reasonableness" as the touchstone
of Fourth Amendment analysis, Akhil Reed Amar has emphasized that
"[r]easonableness must focus not only on privacy and secrecy but also on bodi-
ly integrity and personal dignity." 20 8 He argues that privacy and secrecy inter-
ests are not the only Fourth Amendment interests at stake; the Fourth Amend-
ment must also be concerned with "public humiliation of 'the citizen on the
streets of our cities'." 2 09 Along the same lines, Tracey Maclin, who otherwise
strongly disagrees with Amar over the reasonableness model of the Fourth
Amendment, argues that the underlying vision of the Fourth Amendment is the
need to control the arbitrary exercise of police discretionary power.210
According to Maclin, when the Framers spoke of the privacy and security of
a man's castle and the evils of British customs searches, they envisioned forci-
ble intrusions into private homes authorized by general warrants and writs of
assistance.211 In the Framers' era, the Amendment's underlying purpose was to
control the discretion of government officials to invade the privacy and security
of citizens-the homes and offices of political dissidents, illegal smugglers, or
ordinary criminals alike.2 12 Today, argues Maclin, that same purpose of con-
trolling discretionary authority can and should be applied to the various types
207 Id. at 616.
208 Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1097, 1098 (1998) ("Cops act unreasonably not just when they paw through my pock-
ets without good reason, but also when they beat me up for fun or toy with me for sport.").
See also Castiglione, supra note 175, at 694 (similarly arguing that human dignity captures
Fourth Amendment values that privacy does not and therefore should be incorporated direct-
ly into the "reasonableness" inquiry); Crocker, supra note 175, at 3 (arguing that suspi-
cionless monitoring of what we reveal to others undermines our liberty and the "conditions
of ordinary personal life.").
209 Amar, supra note 208, at 1123 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
210 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vague-
ness Doctrine? 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 414 (2001) [hereinafter Maclin, Vagueness Doc-
trine]; id. at 442 ("The purpose of the Amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights,
is to limit police power."); Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 584-85 (1996) [hereinafter Maclin, Informants]; Tracey Maclin, When
the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25
(1994) [hereinafter Maclin, Cure for the Fourth Amendment]; Tracey Maclin, The Central
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201, 228-29 (1993)
[hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning].
211 Maclin, Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 210, at 414, 418.
212 Id.
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of common contemporary police search and seizure conduct, like street en-
counters and Terry stops. 2 13 It follows that restraining police discretion should
be the crucial consideration when deciding whether intrusive activities are sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny, because "[i]f police are permitted to intrude at
their leisure, we no longer live in a free society," 214 but rather in a "Big Broth-
er" regime envisioned by George Orwell in his book 1984.215
Similarly, for Scott Sundby, the Fourth Amendment is about guaranteeing a
"free society." 216 Sundby would characterize the jeopardized constitutional
value underlying the Fourth Amendment as that of a democratic reciprocal trust
between the citizenry and the government that the citizenry will exercise its
liberties responsibly.217 In contrast, totalitarian governments most often resort
to the use of police power to control their populaces, to convey a message of
distrust and to reinforce the message that the government is superior: "Mea-
sures such as identification checkpoints, random searches, the monitoring of
communications, and the widespread use of informants not only are means of
keeping track of the citizenry, but also act as continuous symbolic reminders
that the citizenry is dominated by the government. "218 Such a message of dis-
trust and assertion of governmental power and control over its citizens is,
Sundby argues, the core problem in the Court's handling of garbage searches 219
or suspicionless urine testing.220 Indeed, Sundby realizes that it is, perhaps, the
subtle acts of power and control that have the more lasting and pernicious ef-
213 Id.
214 Id. at 428-29.
215 See also Eric F. Citron, Right and Responsibility in Fourth Amendment Jurispru-
dence: The Problem with Pretext, 116 YALE L.J. 1072, 1098-99 (2007) (arguing that rather
than emphasizing the individual's right to privacy, Fourth Amendment analysis should focus
on responsible police behavior, and that only the idea that police power must be deployed in
a responsible manner can address what is problematic with pretext).
216 Sundby, supra note 159, at 1754.
217 Id. at 1777.
218 Id. at 1778.
219 Id. at 1792 ("Viewed from a privacy angle, [California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988)] almost seems silly. Do I have a great privacy interest in the Hefty bag full of fruit
rinds and coffee grinds that I groggily haul out in the early morning, stubbing my toe on the
curbside in the process? Of course not.. . . Most people would react strongly to such govern-
ment behavior, but not because the individual has an overarching privacy interest in his or
her garbage. The reaction would arise because of what is revealed about the govern-
ment-citizen relationship where the government has the power to engage in an intrusion like
the searching of one's garbage without any need to justify its actions.").
220 Id.at 1798-99 ("[A] difference in kind does exist between voluntarily giving a urine
sample for medical purposes and the government demanding a sample for urinalysis because
it wishes to randomly check whether its citizens are obeying the law. The former context
does not remotely implicate the government-citizen relationship, whereas in the latter set-
ting, the intrusion's very purpose is the government's assertion of its power over the citizen-
ry to ensure that the law is not being violated.").
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fects on the fabric of government-citizen relations: 22 1
While these scholars correctly observe that we should be concerned with
controlling arbitrary exercise of police discretionary power, whether that power
is manifested through intrusion upon privacy interests, property rights or
human dignity, neither scholar offers a way to evaluate such discretionary po-
lice conduct outside the scope of the existing Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.222 This Article suggests that directly focusing on the power webs at play
in the relations between the police and the individual in any given situation,
while paying close attention to structural hierarchies of power along axes of
gender, race, class, and the like, can offer us much needed guidance.
B. Acknowledging "Power Webs"
Other Fourth Amendment scholars criticize the Court's analytical framework
by focusing directly on police coercion and violence.223 William Stunz criti-
221 Id. at 1806, 1810.
Granted, I agree with Sundby that we should focus our inquiry on state/police power and
control over individuals rather than on privacy. However, Sundby grounds his re-conceptu-
alization of the Fourth Amendment in Liberal political theory, in which the democratic state
is legitimized by the free consent of the governed, as opposed to a totalitarian state, which
relies on power and coercion to maintain its existence. Feminists such as MacKinnon have
challenged this assumption and exposed the ways in which the Liberal State reifies power,
coercion, and male domination in the perpetuation of the ideology of patriarchy. See, e.g.,
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 157-70. The liberal state thus differs from a totalitarian regime
only in that the state systematically exerts invisible power and control over some of its
citizenry more than others, leaving those at the top-white privileged men-both oblivious
to and beneficiaries of gender, class, and racial domination. Consequently, while Sundby's
model contributes to an analytical framework of power and control in general, its liberal
tradition leaves male domination and the subordination of women intact.
222 In his recent article The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, Paul Ohm
laments that while many scholars have correctly criticized the shortcomings of a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence anchored in a privacy analysis in a world with increasingly di-
minished privacy, they have not provided a way forward. Ohm, supra note 85, at 1329-30.
Ohm also identified power (and liberty) as the core and essence of the Fourth Amenmdnet,
unlike both property and privacy, which served us so far as imperfect proxies for what the
Amendment actually protects. Id. at 1337-38. In articulating a Fourth Amendment aimed at
preserving the balance of power between the citizens and the police, Ohm focuses on ways
of leveling the playing field between the police and criminals based on how new technologi-
cal developments may alter the metrics of crime fighting. Id. at 1339-47. While technologi-
cal developments no doubt affect the power imbalances between the state and the individual,
my focus in this article is on conceptualizing power disparities that inherently exist in the
state-individual relations aside from any enhancement by advanced investigative tools. As
such, my critique complements that offered by Ohm, and offers insights into power imbal-
ances that are often obscured by the focus on technology.
223 See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 82, at 1305-06; Seidman, supra note 86; William
Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265
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cizes the anomaly of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that is concerned more
with what the police can see or hear than with how much force the police can
use.224 He argues that the real problem of police misconduct is not information
gathering but violence, and that search and seizure law should therefore refocus
its attention on police violence and coercion.225 Louis Michael Seidman, on the
other hand, argues that the law already focuses on violence and coercion, 226
(1999) [hereinafter Stuntz, Distribution of Privacy]; Stuntz, supra note 173, at 1016; Wil-
liam Stuntz, Reply, 93 MicH. L. REV. 1102 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Reply]; William
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Stuntz, Substantive Origins].
224 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 175, at 1023-24; id. at 1062-66 (discussing Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); Stuntz, Reply, supra
note 223, at 1102-03 ("The Fourth Amendment regulates street stops, but it pays little atten-
tion to how coercively the police behave in those stops-instead, the law concerns itself with
whether and when the police can look in suspects' pockets. So too, the law limits police
officers' ability to enter people's houses but turns a blind eye to how violently the cops
behave once inside . . . . Searches are a bigger deal in Fourth Amendment law than seizures,
even seizures of people. This is a consequence of courts thinking primarily about privacy,
about people's ability to keep secrets, instead of about what makes the police a potential
danger in a free society-the fact that they have guns and clubs and can use them."); Stuntz,
Substantive Origins, supra note 223, at 393-94 ("Consider the following anomaly: The law
of criminal procedure closely regulates when a police officer can look in the glove compart-
ment of my car or ask me questions about a crime, but it pays almost no attention to when
(or how often or how hard or with what weapon) he can strike me. We have very detailed
law governing a host of evidence-gathering issues, but surprisingly little-and surprisingly
lax-legal regulation of police coercion and violence. This state of affairs is both strange
and wrong.").
225 See Stuntz, Distribution of Privacy, supra note 223, at 1273 ("[T]he law would have
to focus not on the interest in keeping things secret or being free of observation, but on the
interest in being free from humiliation or indignity, or the interest in avoiding the stigma that
comes from being publicly identified as a criminal suspect, or the interest in avoiding police
harassment or discrimination."); Stuntz, supra note 175, at 1061, 1062-77; Stuntz, Reply,
supra note 220, at 1102 ("It would be better if the law were to emphasize the one thing that
most distinguishes the police from other government officials: the police use force, some-
times violent force, on individual citizens.").
226 See generally Seidman, supra note 86, at 1086-92. See id., at 1086-87 ("Modern
Fourth Amendment law focuses on what might be called the 'collateral damage' imposed by
searches and seizures rather than on informational privacy.. . . [T]he primary focus of the
collateral damage requirement is not informational privacy. What, then, is the focus? Odd-
ly, the focus is precisely where Stuntz says it should be: on violence, disruption, and humili-
ation."); id. at 1087-89 ("What [Stuntz] fails to recognize, however, is that even legitimate
police house searches necessarily entail considerable violence and disruption and that Fourth
Amendment protections attach precisely because of this collateral damage imposed by legiti-
mate police activity . . . He overlooks the fact that the probable cause and warrant require-
ments exist in part to prevent the prospect of the violence and disruption inherent in searches
unless a magistrate is satisfied that the violence and disruption are cost-justified. Because of
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although he agrees with Stuntz that further measures are needed to regulate
illegitimate police violence.227
Both Stuntz and Seidman, however, approach the core problem of Fourth
Amendment protections as embodying linear externally-visible power relations
between the police and individuals, rendering the underlying power web of the
patriarchal state invisible and intact. In contrast, feminist theory recognizes
that power operates in a direct and indirect web-like manner. Mustafa Kasub-
hai argues that rather than being linear and direct, power flows in multiple
directions. 228 A linear power model does not account for the ways in which
social institutions allocate power to individuals, perpetuate the exercise of such
power, and facilitate others' role in these power webs.229 Hence, power
manifests itself as a social web in which "people, institutions, and language
shape the relationship between a dominant acting agent and a subordinate re-
ceiving agent.
A linear model assumes "that there are two primary agents"-a dominant
agent and a subordinated agent; that there is "one primary use of [direct] force"
by the former over the latter (or at least "an ongoing exercise of force"); and
that there is one resulting effect. 2 3 ' The problem with this linear power model
the risk of this damage, and not because of violations of informational privacy, Fourth
Amendment law requires a warrant and probable cause before the process begins."); id. at
1089 & n.53 ("[S]earches on the street . . . also amount to a species of violence. A typical
search requires the police to delay a suspect who is going about his business, force him to
assume a vulnerable and uncomfortable position, embarrass him before others, and touch all
parts of his body. . . . It is precisely because street stops typically require this use of force
that the Fourth Amendment regulates them."); id. at 1090 ("Of course, if the suspect volun-
tarily acquiesces to the request, the Fourth Amendment does not speak to it. To say that the
suspect does not voluntarily acquiesce is to say that he submits because of the fear of legal-
ized violence. The suspect empties his pockets only because he knows that if he does not,
the officer is authorized to use force to empty them for him. The Fourth Amendment regu-
lates the officer's ability to threaten this force, not because of its concern with informational
privacy, but because threats of violence are, themselves, a form of violence."); Seidman,
supra note 82, at 1301 ("The Fourth Amendment is not solely about informational privacy.
It also speaks to humiliation, inconvenience, embarrassment, and violence.").
227 See Seidman, supra note 82, at 1302 ("I agree that the law should offer greater protec-
tion, especially with regard to the kinds of stops and frisks that are daily occurrences for
many young African American males."); Seidman, supra note 86, at 1087-89 ("I share
Stuntz's concern that the Fourth Amendment does too little to regulate illegitimate police
violence... . Stuntz may well be right that Fourth Amendment protection should go beyond
this point. Perhaps we should impose more stringent limitations on police violence even
when there is probable cause and a warrant to justify the initial entry.").
228 Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in Rape
Law Is Turned on Its Head, II Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 42 (1996).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 43 (Kasubhai refers "to this model as 'dyadic linear' because it sequentially
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is that it does not acknowledge the social relations and privileges which pave
the way for the dominant agent to achieve his goal.232 It "can only recognize
who [directly] wields power and who is subordinated."23 3 As long as a linear
power model treats gender dynamics as independant from society, the model
does not account for social powers and oppressive structures that enable men to
systematically subordinate women.234
On the other hand, explains Kasubhai, "[a] situated conception of power nec-
essarily recognizes that agents in any power model are contextually and struc-
turally situated in a social web."2 35 "Other agents, which may [not be directly
related] to the actual dynamic between the primary actor and subordinate, com-
prise the social web which supports the actor's actions, and reifies the
subordinate's oppressive experience." 236 In the context of Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures, I have suggested elsewhere that such power webs em-
power the police to manifest control and domination over the individual, in
multiple nuanced and invisible ways-consensual police-citizen encounters or
searches based on consent being but two examples.237
Furthermore, both Stuntz and Seidman remain within traditional liberal
boundaries by focusing on overt police abuse and brutality, similar to the
Court's distinction between coerced and voluntary consent.238 Their focus on
physical violence or threat thereof has the same effect of masking structural
coercion and systems of oppression behind the notion of consent.239 We need
to focus on police coercion and abuse not in terms of physical violence or overt
force, but in terms of control and domination based on situated multifaceted
social power webs.
This is not to say that police brutality is no longer relevant or troubling.
describes a causal relationship between two agents (dyadic) from which the dominant
agent's intended action effectuates his desired result.").
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. Thus, for example, MacKinnon suggests that sexuality itself is a power web in
which heterosexual relations per se are infused with violence and control. See generally
MAcKINNON, supra note 152, at 126-54; see also MacKinnon, supra note 152, at 1-17, 46-
61.
237 See Raigrodski, supra note 8, at 49-50.
238 Id.
239 Id. In that Article I argued that "by holding consent to a search as per se involuntary
when coerced by a claim of authority . . . or by a preceding unlawful seizure, . . . and
distinguishing these instances of coercion from all other consensual police encounters, the
Court is able to maintain the fiction that police encounters typically are consensual and that
consent to a search given under such circumstances is voluntary.. . . The individual is thus
presumed to possess the power and choice to resist the police, [resulting] in the erosion of
the Fourth Amendment protections for most individuals."
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Nonetheless, like invasions of one's home or privacy, police brutality is a par-
ticular form of exerting state power over the individual. Some individuals are
most in need of protection against physical violence on the streets. Others are
most vulnerable with regard to their homes or personal effects. And others are
subject to abuse and subjugation by many other power webs which we must
now expose and eradicate. Unfortunately, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
focuses exclusively on invasions of privacy and property, and to a lesser extent
on physical violence, as the prototypical display of abuse of police power.
While providing much needed protection to some, the normative exclusivity of
this narrow paradigm results in little or no protection for many others and per-
petuates the power web of male domination through the State.
C. Re-reading Entick and Wilkes-Toward a Paradigm of Power Webs
Much has been written about the "mischief which gave . . . birth"240 to the
Fourth Amendment-the British King's unbridled search and seizure power-
manifested primarily through aggressive customs enforcement, general war-
rants, and writs of assistance. 24 ' This historical context supports the view that
the Fourth Amendment is more broadly intended to curb government discretion
and power.242 So why is it that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been so
narrowly focused on the government's ability to infringe on property or privacy
rights, particularly on the encroachment of informational privacy? This Article
has suggested that these types of governmental abuse of power have been
viewed as paradigmatic because they often implicate the interests of white priv-
ileged men. In order to fully demonstrate this argument, this article reexamines
the two English cases that historians agree were the source of the Fourth
Amendment: Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood.24 Entick in particu-
240 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
241 See e.g. Amar, supra note 208; Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 210; Clancy,
supra note 178; The Honorable M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Gui-
dance from the Mischief That Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905 (2010).
242 See Michael, supra note 241, at 906; see generally Clancy, supra note 176, at 999-
1000 (Clancy's article provides a detailed review of the historical origins of the Fourth
Amendment, as envisioned and phrased by John Adams. In addition to the Entick and Wilkes
cases which will be discussed in detail infra, Clancy offers a detailed account of James Otis'
argument, and its deep impact on John Adams, in the 1761 Writs of Assistance case. Much
of Otis' argument focused on the way in which the writs of assistance place every person in
the hands of unaccountable petty tyrants with "one arbitrary exertion provok[ing] another,
until society be involved in tumult and in blood." (citing 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
app. A at 524-25 (1850)).
243 (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). Note that the version reported in
Howell's State Trials presents a lengthier judgment written by the Lord Chief Justice Cam-
den, as compared to the shorter per curiam opinion printed in the English Reporter. It is the
Howell's version that has been used in support of the Fourth Amendment history and that is
used here as well.
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lar was at the basis of the Court's recent landmark decision in United States. v.
Jones,245 with Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, referring to it as "the true
and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regards to search and
seizure."246
Entick authored political pamphlets critical of the King's ministers, which
authorities thought libelous.247 In response, Lord Halifax, the British secretary
of state, issued a warrant authorizing the seizure of Entick and all his books and
papers. 248 The executing agents used force and arms to break into and enter
Entick's home, and over a four-hour period pried open all the locked rooms,
chests, and drawers; searched through his private papers; and carried away
many of them.249 Entick sued them in trespass and won.250
Lord Camden held that the Secretary of State had no authority to order the
search and seizure of Entick's papers. 251 He pointed out that "[tlhis power so
assumed by the secretary of state is an execution upon all the party's papers, in
the first instance. His house is rifled; his most valuable secrets are taken out of
his possession. .. . This power ... is not supported by one single citation from
any law book extant."252
Consequently, he held not only that "every invasion of private property ... is
a trespass," but that
[p]apers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an in-
spection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a
trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the se-
cret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and de-
mand more considerable damages in that respect.253
The facts in Wilkes were even more egregious. John Wilkes was a well-
244 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 19 St. Tr. 1153, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) [Howell's
version used]. The historical importance of a third case called the Writs of Assistance Case,
(see M.H. Smith, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (Univ. of Cal. Press 1978)), is more
controversial. Compare Amar, supra note 208, at 772 (describing the writs of assistance
dispute as "almost unnoticed in debates over the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights"),
with Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 210, at 223-28 (finding disputes over writs of
assistance key to colonial understanding of unreasonable searches and seizures), and Clancy,
supra note 178 (arguing that in envisioning and phrasing the Fourth Amendment, John Ad-
ams was deeply impacted by James Otis's argument in the Writs of Assistance case).
245 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
246 Id. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted).
247 Entick, 19 St. Tr. at 1031.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 1029-30.
250 Id. at 1036.
251 Id. at 1064.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1066.
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known Member of Parliament. 2 54 He anonymously authored a pamphlet called
The North Briton, No. 45 that sharply criticized the King's speech to Parlia-
25ment.25 Consequently, Lord Halifax again initiated proceedings for seditious
libel.256 The warrant in this case was a general warrant, directing the agents to
search and seize any of the authors, printers, and publishers of the seditious and
treasonable North Briton, No. 45, and their papers. 257 The agents arrested
Wilkes and many others, and hauled away all of Wilkes's papers in a large
sack, after searching the house for several hours and forcing locked drawers in
his office.2 58 Wilkes won his trespass suit.2 59 Most importantly, Chief Justice
Pratt (soon to be Lord Camden) instructed the jury as follows:
The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons' hous-
es, break open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant,
where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and where no
offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretiona-
ry power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may
chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and
he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property
of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.260
Both decisions emphasized the importance of the privacy interest in homes
and papers. Although tied to notions of property, the chief emphasis was on the
fact that the items seized were papers, which are of such a private nature that
"'so far from enduring a seizure... they will hardly bear an inspection."61 In
addition, both decisions express concern with abuse of official discretion.
Against this context, from the standpoint of the men who later drafted the
Fourth Amendment, it was the combined concern of governmental abuse and
ensuring the privacy of one's home and papers that necessitated the Fourth
Amendment.262 This, in turn, explains the traditional focus of the Court's juris-
prudence on privacy, especially private papers, effects, and homes.
In contrast, a feminist reading of the Fourth Amendment is essentially con-
cerned with power webs and forces us to realize that neither Entick or Wilkes
needs to be treated as paradigmatic, or that any such paradigm is achievable or
desirable. Indeed, Stuntz notes that
254 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 19 St. Tr. 1153, 1156 (U.K.).
255 Id. at 1156.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1156-57.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 1168.
260 Id. at 1167.
261 See Stuntz, Substantive Origins, supra note 223, at 399 (quoting Entick v. Carrington,
(1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (U.K.)).
262 Id. at 399-400.
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[T]he part of criminal procedure that concerns evidence gathering rests on
a paradigm-the ransacking of a home, with an emphasis on rummaging
through the occupant's private papers. That paradigm looks like a police
misconduct problem, but historically it has more to do with the kinds of
things government tries to regulate [such as free speech]. . . . The real
problem of police misconduct is best captured by another paradigm: the
Rodney King beating.263
This alternate paradigm offered by Stuntz highlights the partiality of the pri-
vacy and property paradigms to encompass modern day governmental abuse.
The Rodney King beating-the most notorious incident of police brutality of
our times264-surely serves for many of us, especially members of urban mi-
nority communities, as a vivid and typical example of modem-day abuse by the
state and the police. It evokes similar emotions in our day as Entick and Wilkes
did in their period. More significantly, for many individuals, the threat of being
subjected to police violence on the streets is potentially far more real than the
threat of the government coming into their homes and uncovering personal in-
formation. From their perspective, the Rodney King paradigm better addresses
their primary concerns.
From a feminist stance, however, this paradigm of police violence is also
partial and represents a particular perspective. As any other perspective
cloaked as universal and paradigmatic, it cannot capture the multiple and inex-
tricable power webs through which state power is exerted over the individual.
Rather than fixate on one way or another in which the government and the
police can abuse their power, we should attempt to curb all kinds of govern-
mental oppression, keeping in mind the multiple power webs that construe the
ways we relate to each other. Some governmental conduct will immediately
strike us as egregious, such as the conduct in Entick and Wilkes or in the Rod-
ney King case. Other instances will require a close scrutiny of the power hier-
archies that structure the relations between the government and the individual
in the particular case. Hence, in each case the courts must evaluate the govern-
ment's and the individual's conduct in light of any overt and covert power
imbalances that enable the police to subordinate the individual by exploiting his
particular vulnerabilities.
263 Id. at 447.
264 Rodney King is an African American who, on March 3, 1991, was severely beaten by
Los Angeles police officers following a police chase. A bystander videotaped much of the
incident from a distance. The footage showed police officers repeatedly striking King with
their batons. The footage aired around the world, causing public outrage that raised tensions
between the African American community and the Los Angeles Police Department and in-
creased anger over police brutality and social inequalities. Four officers were later tried in a
state court for the beating but were acquitted. The announcement of the acquittals sparked
the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare
on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al; see generally Greenberg & Ward,
supra note 3 for further resources and analysis.
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We all have our facets of powerlessness, which make us vulnerable to abuse
and subordination to a lesser or greater degree. It is these vulnerabilities that
the powerful invoke and exploit in order to subordinate another to his domina-
tion and control in any given situation. As "Frederick Douglass said: 'Find out
just what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out the exact
measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them.' "265 Mem-
bers of a non-white race, female gender or sexual orientation, and the under-
class have been throughout the ages especially prone to exploitation and subor-
dination by the white heterosexual male elite based on these attributes. But
even those in the position of power and privilege are vulnerable to abuse by the
threat itself that could undermine their power, and hence invalidate their identi-
ty. It is the threat to privileged identity that, this Article suggests, is the crux of
Entick and Wilkes. In the case of Entick and Wilkes, their attributes of vulnera-
bility and powerlessness in relation to the state seem to have been their social
and political status. Not surprisingly, having otherwise belonged to a privi-
leged race, gender, and class, they were primarily vulnerable to governmental
abuse of that which they valued most-their identity as free men and political
actors and the privacy and sanctity of their homes and personal belongings.
Their defining attributes as valued human beings-their political and social
identities-were exactly the ones the state was most likely to abuse and invali-
date in order to send a clear message that Entick and Wilkes were subordinate
to the State. These cases are free speech cases in disguise,2 66 and are also
classic examples of Sundby's liberal theory of citizen-government trust in a
free society.267
A modem equivalent to Entick and Wilkes can be seen in the case of Dr.
Magno Ortega.2 68 Dr. Ortega was a physician, psychiatrist, and longtime Chief
of Professional Education at Napa State Hospital.269 Upon suspicion of mis-
conduct towards the residents in his program, hospital administrators thorough-
ly and on several occasions searched his office, file cabinets, and desk in his
absence.270 Both State and non-State property was seized, including personal
correspondence, billing documentation of private patients, teaching aids, and
notes. 271' All the papers in Dr. Ortega's office were boxed together without tak-
ing any formal inventory.272 Dr. Ortega sued the Hospital alleging violation of
265 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 329 (1987) (citing Frederick Douglass, Speech at Roches-
ter (July 5, 1852)).
266 See Stuntz, supra note 175, at 1061 n.164 ("There is another common thread to En-
tick, Wilkes, and Mapp: all are free speech cases in disguise.").
267 See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
268 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
269 Id. at 712.
270 Id. at 713.
271 Id. at 713-14.
272 Id. at 714.
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his Fourth Amendment rights. 273 To an esteemed physician and teacher it sure-
ly was a disempowering and subordinating experience that sent an unmistaka-
ble message about the employer's power and control. This message did not
escape the notice of the Court, although its interpretation remained cloaked in
terms of privacy.274
The resemblance of this case to the Entick-Wilkes paradigm is clear. For
example, Justice Blackmun observed: "[A]s the plurality itself recognizes, the
'investigators' never made a formal inventory of what they found in Dr. Orte-
ga's office. Rather, they rummaged through his belongings and seized highly
personal items later used at a termination proceeding."275 I would speculate
that the Court sympathized with Dr. Ortega's sense of powerlessness and viola-
tion because, as in Entick and Wilkes, the display of power hit close to home
and potentially posed a threat to the Justices' own similar vulnerabilities.
In contrast, Gail Atwater did not "fit" within the Court's privacy paradigm or
violence paradigm.276 Atwater was driving her pickup truck in Lago Vista,
Texas, with her two young children in the front sit, unbuckled.277 Officer
Turek pulled her over for the seatbelt violations.2 78 Approaching the truck he
yelled "we've met before" and "you're going to jail," and called for backup.279
Atwater failed to provide the officer with her papers, alleging "her purse [was]
stolen the day before," to which the officer replied that he had "heard that story
two hundred times." 280 "Atwater asked to take her frightened, upset, and cry-
ing children to a friend's house nearby, but [the officer] told her, 'you're not
going anywhere,' and apparently threatened to take the children into custody as
well." 281 After Atwater's friend, who learned from the neighborhood children
273 Id.
274 Id. at 719 (holding that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in
his desk and file cabinets).
275 Id. at 736 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); accord. Stuntz, supra note 175, at 1060-61
("The dominant paradigm in search and seizure law has always been the ransacking of a
private home, with an emphasis on rummaging around through the homeowner's books and
papers. This image fits the pair of eighteenth-century cases that had the most to do with the
Fourth Amendment's creation: [Entick and Wilkes] . . . . It also fits Mapp v. Ohio, the most
famous Fourth Amendment case of this century: the officers in Mapp did a top-to-bottom
search of a boarding house, and the evidence they found consisted of a few dirty books that
belonged to the house's owner. Focusing on cases like Entick and Wilkes and Mapp, one
can see why courts would use Fourth Amendment law to protect informational privacy . . . .
It is no surprise that when officers rummage through suspects' dresser drawers, read their
correspondence, or listen to their conversations, courts care deeply about individuals' ability
to keep some aspects of their lives secret from the government.").
276 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355 (2001).
277 Id. at 323.
278 Id. at 324.
279 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
280 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
281 Id. (citations omitted).
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what was going on, arrived and took the children, the officer handcuffed
Atwater and drove her in his squad car to the local police station, where "book-
ing officers had her remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and empty her
pockets."282 Her mug shot was taken and she was placed in a jail cell for an
hour prior to being released on a $310 bond.283 Atwater ultimately pled no
contest to misdemeanor seatbelt offences, paid a fifty-dollar fine, and sued for
violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure.284
The Court noted that Atwater-a well-known established resident of Lago
Vista "would almost certainly have buckled up as a condition of driving off
with a citation. . . . [T]he physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous
humiliations imposed by a police officer, who was (at best) exercising extreme-
ly poor judgment."285 It then went on to hold that Atwater's arrest was surely
humiliating, but it was no more harmful to privacy or physical interests than the
normal custodial arrest.286 "The arrest and booking were inconvenient and em-
barrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment."287
Measured against notions of privacy or physical safety interests, it is possible
to accept the Court's characterization of the harm to Atwater as mere humilia-
tion and of the officer's conduct as poor judgment. But if we focus on the
gender-based power disparities between the officer and Atwater and her vulner-
ability as a mother, which the officer specifically exploited, an alarming picture
of abuse of state power and male domination emerges. Officer Turek was loud
and accusatory from the beginning, he threatened to arrest Atwater in front of
her young children, he refused to allow her to ensure her children were taken
care of, and he even threatened to take the children to jail as well.288 From the
perspective of a woman and a mother, the officer's conduct is not simply poor
judgment and the harm to Atwater was not mere humiliation.289
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 324-25. Amazingly, this description of the facts is taken from the Court's opin-
ion, and does not differ significantly from the facts recited by the dissent. Nonetheless, the
Court reaches its astonishing conclusion.
285 Id. at 346-47.
286 Id. at 354 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
287 Id.at 355.
288 Id. at 324.
289 Cf id. at 368-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The record in this case makes it abun-
dantly clear that Ms. Atwater's arrest was constitutionally unreasonable. . . . There is no
question that Officer Turek's actions severely infringed Atwater's liberty and privacy.
Turek was loud and accusatory from the moment he approached Atwater's car. Atwater's
young children were terrified and hysterical. Yet when Atwater asked Turek to lower his
voice because he was scaring the children, he responded by jabbing his finger in Atwater's
face and saying 'You're going to jail.' . . . Atwater asked if she could at least take her
children to a friend's house down the street before going to the police station. But Turek-
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The dissent in the recent case of Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders290
emphasized that the intrusion on privacy interests signifies degradation and
submission of the individual to the state agents.291' Recall that the Court's con-
sciousness to race-based power disparities in Terry v. Ohio led it to conclude
that rather than being a "petty indignity," a pat-down frisk performed in public
by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless is a "serious intrusion" that
inflicts "great indignity ... and it is not to be undertaken lightly." 292
Had the Court entertained in Atwater a similar consciousness of gender hier-
archies, it might have been more open to accept the idea that Atwater was
subjected to a serious intrusion and suffered, at least, great indignity. The
Court might have also seen that these harms were specifically enabled by the
officer's ability to subordinate and disempower her as a woman and as a moth-
er. It is because of such an exertion of power so as to subordinate the individu-
al that we should hold the officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
While gender hierarchies may have contributed significantly, or even prima-
rily, to the power disparities between the officer and Atwater, gender may not
be the only or the most relevant axis of social power for other people. As
feminist scholars of color point out, privileged white feminists tend to see gen-
der as the main hurdle to full access to social power because they are not im-
peded by class or race.293 On the other hand, Angela Harris suggests that other
women "are oppressed not only or primarily [by their] gender, but [because] of
race, class, sexual orientation, and other" factors that matter in the creation of
inextricable power webs.294 In sum, for each individual, but especially for
members of traditionally subordinated groups, the point of most powerlessness,
and hence most vulnerability to abuse, arises from other power structures,
which have been obscured by the discourse of privacy. Rather than envisioning
any particular display of power as the essence of the Fourth Amendment harm,
this Article suggests the need to accept the multiplicity and complexity of pow-
who had just castigated Atwater for not caring for her children-refused and said he would
take the children into custody as well. . . . Atwater's children witnessed Officer Turek yell at
their mother and threaten to take them all into custody. Ultimately, they were forced to leave
her behind with Turek, knowing that she was being taken to jail. . . . Both of Atwater's
children are now terrified at the sight of any police car.. .. Arresting Atwater []taught the
children .. . that the bad person could just as easily be the policeman as it could be the most
horrible person they could imagine.").
290 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
291 Id. at 1526 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing strip search, involving close observa-
tion of private areas of a person's body, of an individual arrested for a minor offence during
the processing into the corrections facility).
292 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) ( internal quotation marks omitted).
293 See Williams, supra note 154.
294 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 587 (1990).
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er, and structure the protections of the Fourth Amendment around a broader
concept of power.
For example, feminist scholarship about cross-gender prison searches,29 5
electronic monitoring in the workplace, 296 and hostile housing environmentS297
highlight the conflation of privacy with power and control, and provides en-
lightening examples of multiple web-like manifestations of power imbalances.
These examples underscore both the need for a broader understanding of power
and domination and the need for a power-based jurisprudence. Teresa Miller
discusses how prison guards, officials, or other prisoners exploit a prisoner's
sexuality in order to assert control over that prisoner, and how power is sexual-
ized in prison. 298 At the same time, cross-gender searches in prison are also
perceived in light of the class and race identities of both guards and prison-
ers. 299 Consequently, Miller suggests an analysis of the multiple oppressions of
prisoners who challenge cross-gender searches.oo
For instance, are women prisoners who challenge cross-gender searches only
concerned with physical security? Miller suggests that a broader concept of
dignity is at stake. Prison life in America is dehumanizing.301 For many of the
poor, mostly African American female inmates "this dehumanization by the
state echoes similar experiences of personal devaluation in the welfare, foster
care, and juvenile justice systems. . . ."3 02 In light of such experiences of subor-
dination, the women's privacy-based challenges to cross-gender searches
should be understood as claims to human dignity and personhood. Thus, Miller
argues, "a contextualized concept of privacy that stresses both the value of
personhood and protects against the totalitarian abuse of power is needed."303
While Miller's analysis is highly illuminating and important, her focus on
power and control within a continued discourse of privacy is problematic. As
295 See Miller, Cross-Gender Prison Searches, supra note 3; Miller, Sex and Surveil-
lance, supra note 3.
296 See Ehrenreich, supra note 3.
27 See Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile
Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who Is the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 861 (1997).
298 See generally Miller, Sex and Surveillance, supra note 3; See also Miller, Cross-
Gender Prison Searches, supra note 3, at 867-68 ("The power disparity that exists between
men and women in society is magnified within the rigidly hierarchical and closed prison
apparatus. Power is sexualized in prison. Because prison guards exercise near total authori-
ty over prisoners, the potential for male guards to abuse their legitimate access to women's
bodies to conduct bodily searches of women and to visually monitor them nude or only
partially dressed in ways that are overtly sexual is great.").
299 Miller, Cross-Gender Prison Searches, supra note 3, at 873.
3 Id. at 884.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 884-85.
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Rosa Ehrenreich observes, the privacy rubric tends to mask certain harms that
have different impacts on people based on their social and economic status. 304
Ehrenreich argues, on the other hand, that some of the issues we think of and
speak of as privacy issues, such as e-mail monitoring in the workplace, would
be better described and analyzed as issues of power.305 She speculates that
perhaps one reason that we speak of power issues as privacy issues has to do
with the ways in which gender, race and class play a role in constructing both
power and privacy.306 Fundamentally, what is important is for us to "squarely
[]confront the issues of power that lie at the heart of privacy."307 Such direct
confrontation of complex power imbalances distinguishes Deborah Zalesne's
work on the intersections of class and gender in hostile housing environment
claims.3 08 Like other feminist scholars,309 Zalesne argues that sexual harass-
ment, both in the workplace and in rental housing, "is predicated on the imbal-
ance of power."310 First, tenants, especially poor tenants, are often at the mercy
of their landlords." Second, socialized norms further subordinate poor wo-
men, who are the ones often victimized as tenants by sexual harassment." 312
People are socialized to equate power with whiteness and masculinity. As a
result, black women often experience a feeling of powerlessness, leading to
30 See Ehrenreich, supra note 3, at 2049.
305 Id. at 2052-54, For example, she states, "When we think about issues such as []
workplace e-mail monitoring, what really bothers many of us, I think-or what certainly
should bother us-may or may not have much to do with privacy, [in] either the information
control sense or the dignitary sense but it has a great deal to do with power. More specifi-
cally, what should bother us are balances of power [between employees and employers] that
are damaging or inequitable." The problem, suggests Ehrenreich, is that "most American
workers have very little power in relation to their employers." When an employer monitors
his workers' e-mail he is saying: Nothing is yours. All that you think is yours is really mine.
The fundamental problem is not that the boss is likely to find out something about the em-
ployee that is private and that will cause intense humiliation and shame if discovered. The
problem is that in an employment-at-will context this can lead to the employee getting fired
for a wide range of reasons. Depending on the context, it may or may not make sense to
construe this as a privacy issue. Yet regardless of whatever else it is, it is surely a power
issue that stems from the structure of American employment law and from the larger eco-
nomic and social framework of our society. Id. at 2052-54. (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
306 Id. at 2058-62.
307 Id. at 2062.
308 Zalesne, supra note 297, at 861.
309 See, e.g., MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979) ("Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.").
310 Zalesne, supra note 297, at 861.
311 Id. at 882.
312 Id. at 884.
2013] 115
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL
increased vulnerability to sexual harassment.313 Moreover, a power imbalance
between a man and a woman often leads to sexual harassment.314 Thus, the
unequal power relationship involving a dominant male landlord facilitates the
sexual harassment of his women tenants."
The power matrix between a landlord and tenant is not limited to gender. A
landlord's power also derives from economic dominance or from other factors,
such as race or class.316 In employment discrimination cases, the victim of sex-
ual harassment is usually a woman of color.317 When sexual harassment occurs
in the housing context, in comparison, the typical victim is a poor woman of
color.' 8 In addition to the problem of subordination of women by men and
discrimination based on race, sexual harassment in a rental housing context also
involves exploitation of poor people by those in positions of economic power.
These subordinated people come from a cross-section of society that often need
protection on the multiple grounds of sex, race and class discrimination.319
If power in multiple forms is the root of sexual harassment, then, according
to Zalesne, "the law should focus on relations between the oppressor and the
oppressed and question the defendant's actions in light of the power differen-
tials between the parties."320 Similarly, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
should focus on abusive exertion of state power that goes beyond notions of
privacy or physical force. It should acknowledge the multitude and complex
ways in which the state manifests power over individuals beyond violation of
one's security by means of intrusion into one's house, papers, effects and per-
sons. It should focus on embedded power imbalances-the power webs of
gender, class, race and other subordinating and socializing mechanisms-that
enable the police and the state to intrude on the individual in seemingly non-
abusive, and hence constitutional, ways. And it should focus on empowering
the individual by means that truly guarantee personal security as well the secur-
ity of our society.
V. TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Re-imagining Power
Power, observes Martha Minow, is at its peak "when it is least visible, when
it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges from
313 Id.
314 Id. at 882.
315 Id. at 861-62.
316 Id. at 882.
317 Id. at 886.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 886.
320 I] St 885.
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discussion or even imagination."321 Thus, only when we scrutinize the power
webs surrounding us, will we be able to forge strategies to dismantle them.322
The goal of such feminist scrutiny is to change the historic use of power as a
mechanism of exclusion, marginalization and degradation and to change the
status of that exclusion and marginalization as natural and objective judgments
about what is true and valuable.323 Hence, this Article's feminist vision of the
Fourth Amendment confronts power substantively, epistemologically, method-
ologically and doctrinally. Moreover, this vision redefines and transforms the
concept of power. Instead of conceptualizing power in a negative, oppressive
manner, my vision substantively and epistemologically reclaims power as an
inclusive, liberating and equalizing concept.
It seems especially appropriate to urge such an all-out feminist theorization
of power within the context of the Fourth Amendment, because, as this Article
argued thus far, this field of law has always been about power and subordina-
tion. The core vision of the Fourth Amendment, however, has been narrowly
construed and for the most part obscured because it is envisioned from a partic-
ular socially-privileged perspective while presented as being universally appli-
cable and as having no perspective at all. Envisioned from the particular per-
spective of white male property-owners, the Fourth Amendment ensures that
they will not be subordinated by the state and will maintain their social power
in relation to the state and to other less privileged individuals. Because it is
imagined from a white, male, privileged viewpoint, only the state is seen as
imposing a real threat of disempowerment and subordination. Because it is
imagined from a white, male, privileged viewpoint, the individual is seen as
best served by being let alone. Because it is imagined from a white, male,
privileged viewpoint, the battle for power and control is forged around issues of
property, privacy and free speech. These issues, in turn, are also narrowly con-
ceptualized to reflect the extent to which they shape a white, male, privileged
identity.
The Fourth Amendment, as currently construed, is blind not only to power
structures among individuals along race, gender and class lines. It is also blind
to its own perspectivity. The white, male, privileged perspective regards its
own portrayal of the issues as exclusive and as universally applicable. Hence,
state power is the only power to be feared, because no other social power op-
presses white privileged men. Hence, only invasions of privacy, interference
with property, or silencing of speech are viewed as acts that subordinate one's
identity and encroach upon one's autonomy. On the one hand, white, privi-
leged heterosexual men are generally not threatened by sexual or racial vio-
lence; on the other hand, white, privileged heterosexual men are among the
321 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 10, 68 (1987).
322 Kasubhai, supra note 228, at 72-73.
323 Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, 120 (1989).
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elite that indeed possess the privacy, the property and the political speech to be
taken away from them by the state. Theoretically, from its unaware stance, the
Fourth Amendment strikes the appropriate constitutional balance and provides
ample and adequate protection to the individual.
Once its particular perspective is exposed, and other excluded perspectives
are taken into consideration, we realize that a much broader conceptualization
of the Fourth Amendment is needed. For example, we need a Fourth Amend-
ment that would protect women from so-called private abuse and violence by
men. We need a Fourth Amendment that truly protects racial and ethnic minor-
ities on the streets. We need a Fourth Amendment that pays respect to the
public lives of the poor. In sum, the Fourth Amendment must focus on domi-
nation and disempowerment instead of privacy and property. This is not to say
that privacy issues will no longer be relevant. But invading one's privacy must
be understood as only one, non-exclusive form of domination over the individ-
ual. Domination manifests itself in multiple complex webs and being let alone
does not always necessarily empower different individuals or best serve the
community as a whole.
To a very limited extent, modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has paid
attention to exertions of power beyond privacy and property by infusing search
and seizure law with notions of consent and coercion. Nonetheless, as con-
strued from the viewpoint of white, privileged men, only overt traditional mani-
festations of force and coercion are acknowledged doctrinally as being real,
while the basic assumption of free will and agency remains unchallenged. To
the extent that experiences of racial and ethnic minorities can be accommodat-
ed within that traditional framework of power, as when they are brutally beaten
or shot dead by the police, the Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect them.
But since broader social oppressive forces are unaccounted for within our cur-
rent jurisprudence, a great number of people are left unprotected when their
exchanges with the police are deemed non-coercive or as not implicating any
legitimate (privacy) interests. Thus, the current paradigm of power within the
Fourth Amendment may have actually contributed to the exclusion of altema-
tive conceptualizations of power that would truly eradicate the oppression of
those at the bottom of the social hierarchies.
In conceptualizing domination and disempowerment, a feminist Fourth
Amendment theory must acknowledge and represent our social formation and
social situation. We need to recognize that "human beings are formed in their
preferences, abilities, and capacities to respond to coercion, by material circum-
stances, and relationships or affiliations with others."324 We particularly need
to expose the ways in which inequalities of power shape and impact us.325 The
law must acknowledge how we are socialized, especially along lines of gender
324 Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direc-
tion, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 845 (1999).
325 Id.
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and race, to submit to those in power. It also needs to understand how different
power webs make us vulnerable to different things, at different places and at
different times. We should grasp these power webs as perpetually shifting and
reforming, as do our abilities to cope and resist them.
Women's experiences are living proof of such shifting power webs. Women
experience their lives both as victims of oppression and as agents resisting it; as
both subordinated by privacy and empowered by it. One lesson for feminist
jurisprudence lies in the rejection of simple dichotomies and the abandonment
of the either/ors that characterize our current jurisprudence. On many occa-
sions the police dominate the encounter with the individual. In contrast, in
some instances particular individuals successfully resist the oppressive power
of the state and may even dominate the encounter. A simplistic and dichoto-
mized approach to free will and coercion, agency and victimization, power and
powerlessness, cannot ensure that both the individual and the police officers
will be secured, respected and valued as human beings. We need to learn to
accept contradiction, ambiguity and ambivalence in our lives and explore more
"grays" in our conceptions of our own or others' experiences.326
B. A Jurisprudence of Anti-Subordination and Multi-Perspectivity
By focusing on polymorphous power webs and multiple interlocking systems
of subordination as the substantive core of the Fourth Amendment, a feminist
transformation of the Fourth Amendment has only begun. Our substantive
commitment to focus on power webs and interlocking systems of subordina-
tion, and our commitment to redistribute and share social power, may inform
our Fourth Amendment inquiry in multiple ways. It better captures the harm of
oppression that is at the core of the Fourth Amendment; it explains the plausi-
bility and even likelihood of competing realities of harm, especially injurious
realities; and it enables us to choose among these competing realities. Specifi-
cally, this Article argues, it calls for embracing the values of anti-subordination
and empowerment to guide us in resolving power struggles within the context
of the Fourth Amendment.
A principle of anti-subordination and empowerment may help guide us
through the circumstances of Illinois v. Caballes,327 for example, where the
privacy-based analysis left us wanting more. A paradigmatic shift to anti-sub-
ordination and empowerment will take head on the dissent's concern with al-
lowing "suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages and
pedestrians on sidewalks" 2 which are associated with totalitarian regimes.
During the initial traffic stop for speeding, both the officer and the individual
are aware that observable external behavior by the individual (speeding) gave
326 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and
Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387, 397 (1993).
327 543 U.S. 405, 405 (2005).
328 Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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rise to the encounter (the 'seizure') and that the officer is performing his ex-
pected duties. True, while there is an inherent level of power disparities and
submission to state power in most every police-individual encounter, that sce-
nario itself does not suggest that the officer is "taking advantage" of his privi-
leged position to single out and disempower the individual. However, as the
dissent points out, the injection of an additional officer and a drug-detecting
dog into a traffic stop without any seemingly known reason "changes the char-
acter of the encounter between the police and the motorist," which becomes
more adversarial, embarrassing and intimidating.329 To the extent that police-
individual relations are based on trust, we may not want to leave this discretion-
ary expansion of the power imbalances unchecked.
Whereas most people may not necessarily feel intimidated or subordinated
when being surrounded by bomb-detecting dogs at the airport for instance, they
may feel quite differently when they are being singled out and targeted on the
roadside. It is also possible of course that the outcome in this particular case
would not change even under the anti-subordination paradigm. In this case, the
dog sniffed the outside of the car, while the individual was inside waiting for
the speeding ticket to be issued. At the same time, if this became general prac-
tice, as the dissent suggests may soon be the case, we may all feel subordinated
by the state and living with constant fear that big brother is watching. A true
confrontation of oppressive power requires a new legal discourse-one explic-
itly committed to seek out multiple perspectives other than our own. It requires
us to examine the behavior of the police officer and of the individual in light of
the overt and covert power hierarchies between them. The paradigm of anti-
subordination does not offer us a 'one-size-fits-all' solution but rather exposes
and contextualizes the power webs in which we all operate.
The advantage of such a flexible framework, committed to examining the
particular relations between the officers and the individual under the circum-
stances of the case and in light of broader social structures and constrains, can
also help us re-examine Georgia v. Randolph330 and L.A. County v. Rettele.331
This Article argues that the difference between the case of a co-tenant's consent
to a search of a home when the individual is absent and the case when the
police is expressly refused consent to search by the individual on premises and
yet continues to do so nonetheless, must focus on the conduct of the police in
relation to the individual rather than on the privacy interest in the home. In the
latter, as was the case in Randolph, the conduct of the police sends the message
to the individual that the police are in control and that there is nothing in the
individual's power to stop them from entering. The individual has no choice
but to submit to the authority of the state. Recall that the police had no search
warrant or other authority to search the premises, and they therefore sought the
329 Id. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
330 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
550 U.S. 609 (2007).
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consent of the tenants. Being able to search the premises even in the absent of
such consent (which conceptually at least puts the individual in control or at
least on an equal footing with the police) is only possible in a power matrix in
which the individual is inferior to the police or the state and must submit.
Similar dynamics, in comparison, are at play in the many cases where the
court and scholars have struggled with curbing police pre-text and invidious
subjective intent based on race, nationality or class.332 As long as our jurispru-
dence treats such police conduct as irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry, of-
ficers will continue to take advantage of power hierarchies along axes of race
and ethnicity. And the individual involved, as well as the community as a
whole, will continue to lack power exactly for the same reasons that historically
relegated racial and ethnic minorities and women to the bottom, to dis-
empowerment, to subordination.
In contrast, such analysis may justify the outcome of L.A. County v. Ret-
tele.333 The occupants of the house no doubt suffered grave indignation and
fear, as they were woken up to multiple officers, drawn weapons and orders to
remain undressed with their hands up for several minutes.3 34 At the same time,
officers presumably acted in good faith concern for their safety when executing
a valid search warrant. Factually, the occupants had no other choice but to
submit to the show of force and to the authority of the state though they were
innocent of any wrongdoing or suspicion. Nonetheless, when all is said and
done, is this similar to Entick and Wilkes? Is this the kind of police conduct that
the Fourth Amendment intends to curtail? In fact, the Court's cases regarding
innocent mistakes articulate an exception to what otherwise may be viewed as
an egregious violation of the individual's right. It is exactly because the police
did not abuse or benefit, overtly or indirectly, from a position of power over the
individual that we can justify the outcome of the case.
It is also the underlying recognition of and concern with abuse of police
power that animate the remedial aspect of the Fourth Amendment: the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in a criminal trial or the defense of qualified im-
munity in a civil § 1983 suit. Suppression of the evidence under the exclusion-
ary rule is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation;33 5
it depends on the culpability of the police and likelihood of deterring future
police misconduct.336 As the Court recently confirmed in Herring v. United
States. 337 and Davis v. United States,338 "'an assessment of the flagrancy of the
police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus' of applying the
332 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 213-26.
3 Rettele, 550 U.S. at 609.
334 Id. at 611.
335 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009); Davis v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011).
336 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698; Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-28.
337 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
338 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
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exclusionary rule." 339 Indeed, the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule
involved conduct very similar to Wilkes and Entick.340 In contrast, when no
such abuse of police power is present, such as in cases of innocent or negligent
mistakes, the exclusionary rule has not been applied.34 '
While direct examination of police conduct is often limited only to instances
where the individual has been charged with a crime and suppression of incrimi-
nating evidence is sought under the exclusionary rule, much of the problematic
police/state conduct with which this article is concerned never goes beyond that
encounter and may continue unexamined. On occasion, § 1983 suits raise simi-
lar inquiries. This Article suggests that power dynamics inform the qualified
immunity doctrine. For example, in Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Red-
ding,342 while holding that the school officials' conduct was an unreasonable
search in violation of the student's Fourth Amendment right and yet finding
that the assistant principal was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not
clearly established that a school strip search in unconstitutional,343 the majority
notes that it "mean[s] to cast no ill reflection on the assistant principal" because
there is no doubt that his motive was benevolent. 3" Justice Ginsburg, in con-
trast, emphasized that the assistant principal not only subjected the student to a
humiliating strip search but also made her sit on a chair outside his office for
over two hours after the search and at no point attempted to call her parents.345
For Justice Ginsburg, "[a]buse of authority of that order should not be shielded
by official immunity."346
Rettele demonstrates, however, the challenges that may be posed by employ-
ing an anti-subordination analysis. A commitment to anti-subordination and
empowerment requires us, I argued elsewhere, 34 7 to adopt a multi-perspectival
way of knowing, informed by the detailed particularities of our lives. 34 8 This
paradigmatic shift requires abandoning the so-called objective reasonableness
epistemology of the Fourth Amendment altogether.349 We must learn to view
3 Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 701 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)).
340 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), officers broke into the defendant's
home and confiscated incriminating papers; in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920), federal officials went into the defendant's office and made a clean
sweep of every paper they could find; and in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), officers
forced open the door to Ms. Mapp's house flashing a false warrant, handcuffed her and
prevented her attorney from entering, and then officers canvassed the house for obscenity.
341 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.
342 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
343 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2645.
34 Id. at 2644.
345 Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
346 Id.
347 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 213-26.
348 MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 86.
349 See Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 213-226; cf Zalesne, supra note 297, at 885 ("Power
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the world from more than a single, reflexive position.o50 Such multi-perspec-
tival jurisprudence is not solely the ability to see all points of view, but a delib-
erate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. All of us,
regardless of gender, race and class, can access that world. It may not be easy
to understand those whose experiences and values are very different from our
own, yet, it is possible "with concentrated effort, much willingness to listen to
others, and genuine good faith"35' to learn to identify with others and to allow
ourselves to be moved by others.
Of course, claiming to put ourselves in the exact shoes of the other, risks
becoming as essentialist and unattainable as the current (objective) standards.352
At the same time, by trying to take the perspective of another, we acknowledge
the partiality of our own perspective;3 11 it forces us to question our own catego-
ries and assumptions and expose other power webs that may have not affected
us as much as they have others.3 54 As a white woman and a mother, I can
easily imagine the perspective of Gail Atwater, a woman who faced a threat to
her children. As an educated professional, I grasp the seriousness of the intru-
sion into Dr. Ortega's office and private papers. At the same time, I would not
claim to know the pain and indignation suffered by people of color of all clas-
is the root of sexual harassment. The 'reasonableness' standards do not account for the
unique power relationship that often exists between a landlord and a tenant .... [T]he law
should focus on relations between the oppressor and the oppressed and question the defen-
dant's actions in light of the power differentials between the parties. This shift in focus
requires abandoning the reasonableness standards altogether.").
350 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 216. Patricia Williams has described this practice as the
"ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing that is ... at the heart of what is called critical
theory, feminist theory, and the so-called minority critique." Patricia Williams, The Oblig-
ing Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2128, 2151
(1989).
151 See Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 769, 815 (1994) (quoting Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, 1 THE RE-
SPONSIVE COMMUNITY 36 (1991)).
352 As Mari Matsuda points out: "I cannot pretend that I, as a Japanese American, truly
knows the pain of, say, my Native American sister. But I can pledge to educate myself so
that I do not receive her pain in ignorance." Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7, 10 (1989).
353 Minow, supra note 321, at 60.
354 Martha Minow explains: "If you try to break out of unstated assumptions and take the
perspective of [the "other"] ... you may glimpse that your patterns for organizing the world
are both arbitrary and foreclose their own reconsideration. . . . You may see an injury that
you had not noticed, or take more seriously a harm that you had otherwise discounted....
You will then get the chance to examine the reference point you usually take for granted.
Maybe you will conclude that the reference point itself should change. . . . You may find
you had so much ignored the point of view of others that you did not realize you were
mistaking your point of view for reality. Perhaps you will find that the way things are is not
the only way things could be." Id. at 72.
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ses who are often stopped by the police. Nor can I pretend to know the harm
suffered by poor women who have their private lives constantly scrutinized by
welfare and social authorities. But this does not mean that I cannot listen to
their stories and educate myself about their experiences. It does not mean that I
cannot learn to make the connections and see the broader picture of subordina-
tion and invalidation.
It should be noted, however, that when we take other perspectives into ac-
count it does not necessarily mean that the perspective of the "other" will or
should prevail,356 as the earlier discussion of Caballes or Rettele suggests. But
at least it will be seriously considered. In the long term, if we are truly guided
by the values embodied in the Fourth Amendment, police officers and judges
may better weigh the interests of the individual without much effort.357 Further-
more, if we can minimize subordinating encounters between individuals and
the police, or remedy more instances of oppressive governmental conduct in
courts, then we will have fulfilled the promise of the Fourth Amendment and
restore faith in the criminal justice system, at least to some extent.
To sensitize judges, lawyers, police officers and the public to the dynamics
of power webs and to structural hierarchies of subordination, I have suggested
elsewhere that we explicitly adopt a methodology of narratives and incorporate
these first-person narratives into judicial opinions, police training and media
coverage of Fourth Amendment issues.359 this Article similarly suggests that
rather than hypothesizing about the perspective of the individual or the officer
in the abstract, rather than hypothesizing the power dynamics between them,
we make room for concrete personal accounts of the parties involved. 60
Judith Greenberg and Robert Ward, for example, documented the use of nar-
rative in their law and race class to encourage the students to confront both the
Rodney King controversy and the more general evidence of deeply embedded
prejudice in modem society and the modem legal regime.361 The students in
Greenberg's and Ward's class studied various narratives ranging from formal
35 At the very least, the very impossibility of fully knowing the perspective of another
invites a certain amount of humility and self doubt when we try to gain knowledge, which in
turn may allow us to "glimpse" a point of view other than our own, or at least to acknowl-
edge that our own point of view is not the only truth and to open our minds to accept more
than one, two, or even three truths in any given situation. See Martha Minow, When Differ-
ence Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal
Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 129-30 (1987).
356 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 218.
357 Id. at 218.
358 Id.
359 Id. at 218-26.
3 See generally id. at 218-26 (giving a detailed account of utilizing first-person narra-
tives in lieu of abstract so-called objective theorizing, such as the use of reasonable person or
reasonable officer fictions).
361 Greenberg & Ward, supra note 3.
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trial documents to media coverage to personal testimonies of experiences with
racism.362 Significantly, students related more to the first person accounts of
racism. They empathized with the pain and helplessness of the victims3 63 and
consequently better understood how race and experience with racism shape
identity.36 These first person narratives were effective in allowing the students
to connect their own identities with those of people of a different race and to
develop a consciousness of the realities of race and racism.365 In the same way,
first person stories about police-citizen encounters may allow judges, police
officers and the public to connect and "allow ourselves to be persuaded by
stories that previously seemed unbelievable because of their unfamiliar other-
ness." 366
More importantly, we should view our commitment to giving voice to multi-
plicity and diversity as part of an expanded commitment to the true sharing of
social power. 367 Multiperspectivity and anti-subordination are substantive com-
mitments. First, they place a duty on us to make decisions "based on genuine
attempts at understanding the perspectives and social circumstances of
others,"368 and to making choices with care and humility. Second, they require
a willingness to reach results that redistribute power: "[We must] be willing to
accept the hard choices-and losses-that true redistribution would entail."369
As the Court's Fourth Amendment cases demonstrate, however, we are
bound to face situations where the individual may view the police conduct as
subordinating while the police are truly trying to exercise their power in a re-
sponsible and respectful manner. We must recognize that their multiple stories
reflect multiple experiences and realities,370 which also means acknowledging
"the tragic impossibility of all prevailing at once."3 71 How can we then choose
among competing stories from the perspectives of the police officer and the
individual? How do we support responsive governance and effective policing
362 Id. at 340.
363 Id.
36 Id. at 341.
365 Id. at 342.
366 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 219. "Voicing multiple stories and experiences of subor-
dination conveyed particularly through first-person narratives is also important to the indi-
vidual who is telling his or her story. Personal narratives [have an] empowering potential
which is uniquely suited to redress the traditional invalidation of outsiders by the exclusion
of their stories and perspectives from the law. . . . [T]he legal discourse of the Fourth
Amendment can [thus] become empowering to the individual by letting the person's un-
mediated voice be [heard]." Id. at 220.
367 Id. at 221.
368 Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasona-
bleness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1232 n.201 (1990).
369 Id. at 1233.
370 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 222.
371 Minow, supra note 321, at 78.
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while ensuring security, trust and empowerment for the individuals? Here as
well, our substantive commitment to focus on power webs and interlocking
systems of subordination, and our commitment to redistribute and share social
power, can inform the decision-making process. A jurisprudence of power that
is captured in the principles of anti-subordination and empowerment may en-
able us to choose among these competing realities.372
How do we identify subordination? As a start, "[w]e can determine when
subordination exists by looking at social indicators: wealth, mobility, comfort,
health, and survival tend to mark the rise to the top and the fall to the depths,"
observes Mari Matsuda.17 ' At the same time, domination manifests and perme-
ates in multiple ways that cannot be reduced to one essence.374 Focusing on the
moral crux of the matter rather than articulating one formula is exactly what we
need. "Valuing the principle of antisubordination," observes Leti Volpp, "is
more than a game of hierarchical rankings of 'who's most oppressed'; it means
a serious commitment to evaluating and eradicating all forms of oppression.""'
We should explicitly examine whether an individual was less powerful than
the police in the specific case, and whether the police exploited or benefited,
directly or indirectly, from its power over the individual. We can assume that
typically the police are more powerful than the individual, even though this is
due to the operation of social forces outside the specific encounter and to the
individual's social position. We can also assume that the police benefit from its
privileged position of power and the relative powerlessness of the individual,
even if the officer does not intentionally exploit the vulnerability of the individ-
ual. Finally, we can assume that the individual is subordinated at least to the
extent that the police benefit from the individual's relative powerlessness.
Consequently, the burden should be on the state to persuade us that no power
disparity, in its broadest sense, operated to the disadvantage of the individu-
a376al.6
In examining whether the government officers unfairly benefit from such
power imbalances, our inquiry should not be limited to intentional exploitation
of power. Power imbalances are often invisible and appear natural. However,
as long as people are disadvantaged because of their non-white race, for exam-
ple, white people enjoy the privilege and power that accompanies whiteness.
As long as male ideology and perspective dominate the world, men enjoy the
372 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 223.
373 See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2362 (1989).
374 Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373,
1388 (1986).
375 Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 97-98 (1994) (arguing that "[a]ntisubordination is a value that the
legal system must factor into [the decision] whether to present testimony as to a defendant's
cultural background").
16 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 224.
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social status and privilege of those on the top of the hierarchy, regardless of
whether they harbor personal hostility toward those beneath them or not. In
contrast, a jurisprudence of anti-subordination imposes a moral obligation on
the powerful to act from the perspective of those less powerful. The police
should attempt to see the world from the point of view of those they control and
exercise their power accordingly. Judges should expressly examine questions
of power, identifying the power matrix between the parties in light of a variety
of factors, which contribute to an imbalance of power in the specific case.
Judges must then determine whether such power disparities were exploited in
an impermissible way. Such an experience would not necessarily tell them
what result to reach, but it may give them, and all of us, a way to forge new
approaches to the core protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's rethinking of its long standing Fourth Amendment privacy dis-
course in U.S. v. Jones, while at the same time re-emphasizing a property-
based paradigm of the Fourth Amendment, should prompt us to rethink Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole. This Article employed feminist episte-
mology and feminist methodology to argue that rather than viewing the Fourth
Amendment as intended to specifically protect either privacy or private proper-
ty interests, we should focus on the real issues of power and control that fuel
searches and seizures.
The Article offered a feminist critique of the public-private discourse in
search and seizure law, and the dichotomies of home/market and intimate/com-
mercial that animate it. Consequently, this Article argues that the Fourth
Amendment property and privacy discourse and the public-private dichotomy
are construed to protect the interests of white privileged men and to perpetuate
male ideology and domination. This dominant narrative of protecting one's
property and privacy from the tyrannical hands of the government is supported
by the history of the Fourth Amendment, but, as this Article has argued, is not
mandated by it.
In fact, a feminist re-reading of the historical sources of the Fourth Amend-
ment further supports reframing the Fourth Amendment within a theory of
power hierarchies and oppression. Limiting the scope of constitutional protec-
tion to the experiences and property and privacy interests of the white privi-
leged men has come at a significant expense to the security of many others.
Instead, we need to conduct our Fourth Amendment inquiries through a prism
of multiple, web-like power hierarchies. In so doing, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence can build on anti-subordination principles, which are especially
suited for the newly envisioned power-centered Fourth Amendment.
Feminist jurisprudence has much to offer to the Fourth Amendment as a
matter of substance, as a matter of epistemology, and as a matter of methodolo-
gy. Instead of limited privacy and property it rethinks power; instead of rea-
sonableness it examines power webs with a commitment to anti-subordination;
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instead of abstract objectivity, it offers multiple perspectives and experience-
based personal narratives. Taken for all it has to offer, feminist emphasis on
diversity of voices and perspectives, especially those who have so far been
excluded, on personal narratives and on the importance of eradicating hierar-
chical power structures provide the initial tools sufficient to start imagining a
different Fourth Amendment and with it, a more just society.
